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CONSCRIPTION AND THE CONSTITUTION:
THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING
Leon Friedman*
I. INTRODUCTION

T

general words of the Constitution-famous phrases such as
"due process," "freedom of speech," "interstate commerce,
and "raise and support armies"-are not self-evident concepts. As
Justice Frankfurter said, "The language of the [Constitution] is to
be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols
of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those
who employed them. Not what words did Madison and Hamilton
use, but what was it in their minds which they conveyed?" 1 While
the framers obviously could not have foreseen the discovery of electromagnetic radio waves or atomic energy, and had no "intent"
concerning the regulation of television stations or uranium piles,
they knew only too well the dangers of a professional army and the
need for training and mobilizing the citizens for defense. They
considered these problems in more detail than those of virtually
any other governmental function, and thus the plans they made for
our nation's military forces deserve detailed inquiry. Such a study
reveals that the military structure presently existing in the United
States, which depends primarily upon direct conscription of citizens
into the federal army, fails to meet the standards established by the
framers of the Constitution in 1787.
Arguments about conscription produce rather strange alliances.
The left has traditionally opposed the draft on the grounds that it
violates the conscientious beliefs of those opposed to war, compels
participation in military adventures against reform movements
throughout the world, and generally lays the heavy hand of government too forcefully on the shoulders of every citizen. The conHE
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1. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1950) (concurring opinion).
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tinuing viability of this tradition is exemplified by Senator Mark
Hatfield's recent assertion that a volunteer army would "preserve
individual liberty and freedom as much as possible from unjustified
intrusion by the government" and still provide "maximum national
security with the greatest efficiency and economy." 2 The far right
also has frequently called for a volunteer army, but for markedly
different reasons. Many conservatives and military men prefer a
professional army since regulars are more easily trained and controlled, and a permanent corps is more efficient in the long run because of the lower turn-over in personnel. Such a professional force
also fits traditional elitist ideas held by the right about the organization of society.
Others have argued that a federal draft is necessary not only to
mobilize the nation's manpower most efficiently in an emergency,
but also to serve as a check upon military adventures that offend the
political conscience of the country. While a volunteer army would
necessarily be "composed of the poor and the black," 3 a conscripted
army is made up of all classes. And, to the extent that the sons of
the middle class are unwilling hostages of the military, their parents
will want to know exactly where they will be sent and why. Opposition to the Vietnam war seems to be growing even among the
traditionally conservative areas of the Midwest for precisely this
reason. President Nixon, who reads the political pulse very clearly,
has pressed for an end to the war and an end to the draft 4 because
he is aware of these sentiments.
Thus, the basic organization of our military forces involves
problems that are crucial to the democratic process. The worries
and concerns that troubled the framers of the Constitution are still
with us, and, as the debate on the draft continues, another look
backward may be worthwhile.
II. THE SELECTIVE DRAFT LAW CASES
A. Background of the Cases
In the 1918 decision of the Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver
v. United States),5 the United States Supreme Court first upheld
the constitutionality of congressional conscription. These decisions
have never been seriously challenged, and have been cited re2. A Volunteer Army Is the Answer, N.Y. Times, March 30, 1969, § 6 (Magazine),
at 34, 35.
3. G. REEDY, WHO WILL Do OUR FIGHTING FOR Us? 56 (1969).
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
5. 245 U.S. 366. Arver was the principal decision among the three contemporaneous cases dealing with the question; see notes 8-9 infra and accompanying text.

Hereafter "Arver" will be used interchangeably with "Selective Draft Law Cases."
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peatedly as determining that question once and for all time. This
Article will attempt to show that the Selective Draft Law Cases
were based upon superficial arguments, disregard of substantial
historical evidence, and undue deference to the exigencies of the
First World War-in short, that they were incorrectly decided.
The cases arose in the midst of World War I and were decided
only eight months after passage of the 1917 draft law.6 The Selective
Draft Act had been signed into law on May 18, 1917, and June 5
was set as registration day for all young men of draft age. Two
who refused to register were Joseph F. Arver and Otto H.
Wangerin; they were indicted on June 8, 1917, tried the following
month before a United States district court in Minnesota, found
guilty, and sentenced to one year in prison. The Supreme Court
granted a writ of error directly to the trial court7 and argument
was presented on December 13 and 14, 1917, along with the cases
of other draft resisters from New York. At the same time the Court
heard the appeals of Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman,"
two noted anarchist leaders who had been found guilty of conspiring to counsel resistance to the draft law in New York, and
the appeals of Charles E. Ruthenberg, Alfred Wagenknecht, and
Charles Baker, prominent Ohio Socialists who were convicted of
encouraging a young man not to register.9
In asserting the invalidity of the draft, the defendants pressed
two primary arguments: that the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude deprived Congress of any power to
conscript; and that the draft conflicted with the militia clauses of
the Constitution since the federal government had effectively destroyed the state forces by drawing all the members of the state
militia into federal service and shipping them overseas. In the
course of their argument, the defendants traced the history of
English military organization, emphasizing that no general conscription law had been passed in England prior to the twentieth century.
They also claimed that the acts and regulations of the draft unlawfully delegated legislative authority to the President.
The Government's case was argued by John W. Davis, then
Solicitor General, later Democratic presidential candidate, and one
of the greatest advocates ever to practice before the Supreme Court.
6. Act of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 76.
7. At this time, a writ of error could be taken from the district court directly to
the Supreme Court in any case involving "the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States." Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 238, 36 Stat. 1157.
8. Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474 (1918).
9. Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918).
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Davis submitted a joint brief for all of the cases, and Chief Justice
Edward White carefully followed it in his opinion upholding the
law. Davis characterized the power to conscript as an essential attribute of sovereignty. He cited the large number of nations enforcing
compulsory military service in 1917, concluding: "It would be a
contradiction in terms to declare the Government of the United
States a sovereign, endowed with all the powers necessary for its
existence, yet lacking in the most essential of all-the power of
self-defense."' 0 The Government also cited the many colonial and
state laws in force before 1787-almost 200 were listed-calling
for compulsory militia service by all male ciitzens. Davis argued that
the fact that a federal draft was proposed (although not passed) in
1814 and the fact that a conscription law was enacted during the Civil
War showed the practical exercise of the power and was therefore a
recognition of it.
Nor were the militia clauses of the Constitution 1 ' relevant, he
claimed, since men were taken directly into a federal army by the
1917 law rather than as members of a federalized state militia.
Finally, the Government dismissed the thirteenth amendment argument by pointing out that the sole purpose of the amendment was
to abolish chattel slavery, not to eliminate compulsory governmental
service.
Surprisingly, none of the parties in the Selective Draft Law
Cases relied to any extent on precedent or history. There had been
a few remarks about conscription in earlier federal cases,' 2 and a
Pennsylvania Supreme Court case, Kneedler v. Lane, 3 had upheld
the Civil War draft. But no Supreme Court decision that was on
point had ever been handed down. Even though the Government's
brief was 137 pages long, only three pages were devoted to the Constitutional Convention of 1787 and to the various state ratifying
conventions while an additional three pages contained citations
from The FederalistPapers. Yet these sources are traditionally the
most important aid to constitutional interpretation. Moreover, the
petitioners' briefs in Arver discussed the same subject matter in only
one paragraph. Thus, the Court was deprived of the most crucial
materials on which to base its decision.
The Supreme Court's unanimous opinion upholding the con10.
(1918).
11.
12.
Wall.)
13.

Brief for the United States at 10, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl.16; id., art. I, § 10.
See, e.g., In re Grimley, 1 7 US. 147, 153 (1890); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13
397, 408 (1871).
45 Pa. 288 (1863).
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scription law followed the government's presentation closely. In
essence, Chief Justice White found that the constitutional provisions granting Congress power "to declare war"' 4 and "to raise
and support armies,"' 15 combined with the necessary and proper
clause, permitted the Government to draft citizens directly into a
federal army.'
The Chief Justice's opinion placed principal reliance on five
points. (1) The constitutional language allowing Congress to raise
armies permitted a compulsory draft, since Congress must have the
power to procure men by any means for those armies. (2) All nations
as attributes of sovereignty have the right to conscript. (3) The
English had compelled military service throughout their history.
(4) The colonies had also used conscription into the militia. (5)
The Continental Congress' lack of power to raise and control its
own army was one of the reasons for the formation of the new Constitution. The Court then went beyond the Federalist period and
noted that in 1814 Secretary of War James Monroe had proposed
a plan for conscription, and that a conscription law had been passed
during the Civil War. An analysis of each constituent part of the
Court's opinion shows how the political pressures of World War I
produced a chain of errors in this most crucial case concerning the
federal government's relationship to its citizens.
B. ConstitutionalLanguage
Chief Justice White began his opinion by quoting the various
military clauses in the Constitution. He then wrote:
As the mind cannot conceive an army without the men to compose
it, on the face of the Constitution the objection that it does not give
power to provide for such men would seem to be too frivolous for
further notice.... [I]t is said, the right to provide is not denied
by calling for volunteer enlistments, but it does not and cannot indude the power to exact enforced military duty by the citizen. This
however but challenges the existence of all power, for a governmental power which has no sanction to it and which therefore can
only be exercised provided the citizen consents to its exertions is
7
in no substantial sense a power.'
14. Art. I, § 8, d. 11.
15. Art. I, § 8, l.12.
16. The Government cited an earlier federal case, United States v. Sugar, 243 F.
423, 436 (E.D. Mich. 1917), for the proposition that "power to declare war necessarily
involves the power to carry it on, and this implies the means, saying nothing . . .
of the express power 'to raise and support armies' as the provided means.' Since war
had been declared, it was not necessary to distinguish between the two sources of
congressional power. Brief for the United States at 12, Ruthenberg v. United States, 245
U.S. 480 (1918).
17. 245 U.S. at 377-78.
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However, as shown below,' 8 the proposed grant of power to raise a
federal army by any means was questioned or opposed by a substantial political group when the Constitution was submitted for
ratification. The Antifederalists did not wish a standing army of any
kind to be established by the central government; thus the bare
power to enlist a military force was significant in terms of the Confederation experience and in terms of the restrictions suggested by
the critics of the Constitution. Furthermore, none of the federal
government's enumerated powers can be exercised "without the men
to compose" the offices involved. Did the grant of authority "to establish Post Offices" carry with it the power to conscript postmen? Does
the power to "coin money" include the power to conscript employees
for the mint? Without the specific grants in article I, Congress
might not be able to expend public monies to build post offices or
mints or to buy arms, and might not even be able to pay its employees in these branches of government. But no one ever suggested
before the Arver case that any other enumerated power included
authority to compel service in the governmental organization involved.
C. Universality of Conscription
To show that compulsory service was required by the Constitution, the Court noted that in 1918 most of the nations of the world
had compulsory military service. 19 However, the fact that every other
nation in the world may have enforced conscription during World
War I is irrelevant if the framers of the Constitution did not grant
Congress that power. The United States may be the only nation
with an electoral college system of choosing its chief executive or
with a federal system with prohibitions on local interference with
interstate commerce. The fact that virtually every other jurisdiction
in the world permits the use of illegally seized evidence in criminal
trials is of no relevance when an interpretation of our Constitution
is at issue.
Compulsory military service was not enacted in any modem nation until more than ten years after the ratification of the Constitution. A leading authority on conscription has described it as
"something characteristically modern [which] occurred for the first
18. See text accompanying notes 128-74 infra.
19. 245 U.S. at 378:
It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its
duty to the citizens includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render
military service in case of need and the right to compel it. . . .To do more than
state the proposition is absolutely unnecessary in view of the practical illustration afforded by the almost universal legislation to that effect now in force.
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time in France [in] 1798."20 Moreover, to argue that the Constitution does not permit a draft does not deny the "obligation of the
citizen to render military service in case of need and the right to
compel it." The framers knew that the nation's manpower might
have to be marshalled in an emergency; but, as shown below, the
system they selected was one requiring mobilization through the
state militia system, not direct conscription into a federal army.
Finally, at present, a much smaller group of nations enforces direct
conscription than did in 1918; for example, Great Britain, Canada,
India, and Pakistan do not have a direct draft today. 21 But clearly
the Constitution does not change as a larger or smaller number of
foreign states pass laws on military service, and thus the Aruer
Court's reliance on the universality of conscription is at best marginally relevant.
D.

The English Experience

The next argument advanced in the Selective Draft Law Cases
was drawn from the military history of Great Britain. In one rather
terse paragraph, the Court concluded:
In England it is certain that before the Norman Conquest the duty
of the great militant body of the citizens was recognized and enforcible ....
It is unnecessary to follow the long controversy between
Crown and Parliament as to the branch of the government in which
the power resided, since there never was any doubt that it somewhere resided. So also it is wholly unnecessary to explore the situation for the purpose of fixing the sources whence in England it came
to be understood that the citizen or the force organized from the
militia as such could not without their consent be compelled to
render service in a foreign country, since there is no room to contend that such principle ever rested upon any challenge of the right
of Parliament to impose compulsory duty upon the citizen to perform military duty wherever the public exigency exacted, whether
at home or abroad. This is exemplified by the present English Ser22
vice Act.

To cite the English experience before the Norman Conquest as
a precedent for the American Constitution is far fetched at the
very least. Similarly, the fact that the English Service Act of 1916
may have compelled service abroad has little relevance to the intention of the framers in 1787. But, ignoring these difficulties, the
20. Colby, Conscription in Modern Form, TrE INFANTRY JOURNAL, June 1929,
quoted in Freeman, The Constitutionality of Peacetime Conscription, 31 VA. L. RV.
40, 68 (1944).
21. Conscription, in 6
22. 245 U.S. at 378-79.

ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRTANN CA

366, 368 (1967 ed.).
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Court leaped over a thousand years of English history in a few brief
sentences and disregarded the crucial period preceding the Revolutionary War. The latter omission is particularly unfortunate, for an
examination of the relevant historical period clearly demonstrates
that during colonial times the regular army forces in England were
always composed of volunteers.
In Cromwell's time, the Levellers and other republican supporters had demanded specific protection against conscription as
part of the basic freedoms of all Englishmen. The original "Agreement of the People" presented to the Council of the Army in 1647
contained a section which proclaimed that "constraining any of
us to serve in the wars is against our freedom; and therefore we do
23
not allow it in our Representatives."
The Agreement of the People which was finally passed by the
House of Commons in 1648 specifically provided:
We do not empower [Parliament] to impress or constrain any person to serve in foreign war, either by sea or land, nor for any military service within the kingdom; save that they may take order for
the forming, training and exercising of the people in a military way,
to be in readiness for resisting of foreign invasions, suppressing of
sudden insurrections, or for assisting in execution of the laws; and
may take order for the employing and conducting of them for those
ends; provided, that even in such cases, none be compellable to go
out of 4the county he lives in, if he procure another to serve in his
2
room.

The behavior of Cromwell's troops in suppressing Parliament and
taking command of the government proved to later commentators
that a standing military force, independent of legislative control,
was the most dangerous enemy of liberty. John Trenchard, one of
the great liberal pamphleteers and an important influence on
American colonial thought, wrote in 1698 that Cromwell's reign
was
a true and lively Example of a Government with an Army; an Army
that was raised in the Cause, and for the sake of Liberty; composed
for the most part of Men of Religion and Sobriety. If this Army
could commit such violences upon a Parliament always successful,
that had acquired so much Reputation both at home and abroad, at
a time when the whole People were trained in Arms, and the Pulse
of the Nation beat high for Liberty; what are we to expect. .. in a
25
future Age.

23. S. GARDINER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE PURITAN REVOLUTION,
1625-60, at 334 (2d ed. 1899).
24. Id. at 368-69.
25. A Short History of Standing Armies, in 1 A COLLECTION OF TRacrs OF JOHN
TRENCMTARD AND THOMAS GORDON 71-72 (1751).

June 1969]

Conscription and the Constitution

1501

Trenchard described the subsequent excesses of Charles II's
time-the bribery of Parliament, the dissolution of the municipal
corporations, the defiance of the Constitution-as a direct outgrowth of the king's control of a professional army.2 6 Seizing upon
the pretext of a war with Holland, Charles raised a force of 12,000
men but kept half of them near London so that they would be
available for use against the legislative leaders. When the House
of Commons ordered the Army disbanded, Charles dissolved Parliament; a new House again voted to disperse the army, and passed
a resolution stating that "the continuance of any Standing Forces
in this Nation other than the Militia, was illegal, and a great
'2 7
Grievance and Vexation to the People.
Charles' successor, James II, continued the effort to maintain
his own armed forces. When the Duke of Monmouth attempted to
overthrow him in 1685, James increased the army to 15,000 men
and later 30,000. To strengthen his position against Parliament, he
sought allies among the Protestant dissenters and filled the army
with Irish Catholics until they constituted about one third of his
total forces. According to Trenchard, James "violated the Rights of
the People, fell out with the Church of England, made uncertain
Friends of the Dissenters and disobliged his own Army; by which
means they all united against him." 28 William of Orange and Mary
ascended to the English throne in 1689, and shortly thereafter
Parliament passed a Declaration of Rights, the basic Bill of Rights
in the English Constitution. The sixth article of the Declaration
stated: "That the raising or keeping a standing army within the
kingdom in time of peace, unless it be with consent of parliament,
is against law."2 9 In Trenchard's view, however, even William went
too far in organizing his army. War in Ireland led Parliament to
grant the king 50,000 men and Trenchard wrote: "I will venture
to say, that if this Army does not make us Slaves, we are the only
People upon Earth in such Circumstances that ever escaped it, with
the 4th part of their number."80
John Trenchard and his later collaborator Thomas Gordon were
significant transmitters of English liberal thought to the colonies.
Historian Bernard Bailyn wrote of the English "coffeehouse radicals":
26. Id. at 74-75: "But he durst not have dreamt of all these Violations if he had
not had an Army to justify them . . . . [H]e rais'd Guards in England (a Thing
unheard of before in our English Constitution) and by degrees increas'd them, till
they became a formidable Army ..

27. Id. at 76-77
28. Id. at 80.
29. 1 W. & M., 2d sess., c. 2 (1688 OS.).

30. Trenchard, supra note 25, at 78.
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More than any other single group of writers they shaped the mind
of the American Revolutionary generation. To the colonists the
most important of these publicists and intellectual middlemen were
those spokesmen for extreme libertarianism, John Trenchard . . .
and Thomas Gordon. 31
The overreachings of Cromwell, Charles II, and James II through
their control of standing armies were prominent in the minds of the
colonists as examples of the destruction of freedom; as Trenchard
had written, "in no Country, Liberty and an Army stand together;
so that to know whether a People are Free or Slaves, it is necessary
only to ask, whether there is an Army kept amongst them."3 2 The
answer to this threat lay in a militia system in which the "Nobility
and chief Gentry of England are the Commanders, and the Body
of it made up of the Freeholders, their Sons and Servants.13 3 To
Englishmen who shared this belief that a professional army was an
instrument of tyranny, the idea of direct conscription into that
force was unthinkable.
Proposals to conscript for the regular Army were advanced in
Parliament in 1704 and 1707, but were rejected. 34 Moreover, under
the military laws passed in 1756, 35 1757,36 1778, 37 and 1779,38 only
idle and disorderly persons were pressed into service, and then only
as punishment. This too was strongly condemned. It is true that
compulsory service for the British militia system was theoretically
established during this period; the act of 1757 provided an elaborate
structure for choosing the militia on a territorial basis."" However,
an extensive system of exemptions or substitutes made it extremely
unlikely that a nonvolunteer would be taken. Professor J. R.
Western, the leading expert on the English militia system, has
noted:
The development of the law on the raising of militiamen can be
summed up by saying that the principle of obligatory personal service receded farther and farther into the background. Every facility
and encouragement was given for the discharge of the obligation by
seemed
some means of voluntary enlistment, and few balloted men
40
to have had to serve in person save by their own free will.
31. THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 35 (1967).

32. Trenchard, An Argument Shewing that a Standing Army Is Inconsistent with a
Free Government, in 1 A COL.ECTION oF TRACTs, supra note 25, at 14.
33. Id. at 23.
34. Freeman, supra note 20, at 68-69.
35. 29 Geo. 2, c. 4.
36. 30 Geo. 2, C. 8.
37. 18 Geo. 3, c. 53.
38. 19 Geo. 3, c. 10.
39. 30 Geo. 2, C. 25, §§ 19-21.
40. THE ENGLISH MILITIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 254 (1965).

June 1969]

Conscription and the Constitution

1503

Professor Western also points out that a great many Englishmen
found compulsory military service so "profoundly distasteful" that
there were numerous riots against service in the militia after passage
of the act of 1757, but that popular unrest abated when it became
understood that the law could be avoided and "real conscription
was not to be introduced."4 1 This strong popular opposition to conscription occurred despite the fact that the English militia acts
specifically provided that no militiamen would be forced to serve
abroad and that only a limited amount of service was required at
home.42 Nonetheless popular hostility to military service was widespread and the people's aversion to forced military service, even in
the militia, continued for many years.
The American colonial leaders were steeped in this anti-military
tradition; the available evidence indicates that they were extremely
sensitive to the dangers of a professional army and that they saw
clearly the distinction between regular forces and the armed citizenry composing the militia. They were also conscious of the fact
that no general compulsory conscription law for the regular army
was in force in England during the eighteenth century.
E.

The Colonial Militia

After discussing the English experience, the Supreme Court in
the Selective Draft Law Cases cited the colonial militia system as a
precedent for conscription:
In the Colonies before the separation from England, there cannot
be the slightest doubt that the right to enforce military service was
unquestioned and that practical effect was given to the power in
many cases. Indeed the brief of the Government contains a list of
Colonial acts manifesting the power and its enforcement in more
than two hundred cases ....

[I]t is indisputable that the States in

response to the calls made upon them [by the Continental Congress]
met the situation when they deemed it necessary by directing enforced military service on the part of the citizens. In fact the duty
of the citizen to render military service and the power to compel
sanctioned by the
him against his consent to do so was expressly
43
constitutions of at least nine of the States.
However, the colonial militia system has only the most tenuous connection to any modern conscription program. In the first place, the
militia was thought of as the armed citizenry as a whole; that is,
every able-bodied man was expected to own a weapon and to use it
41. Id. at 290-91.
42. E.g., 30 Geo. 2, c. 25, §§ 19, 24, 51 (1757).

43. 245 U.S. at 379-80.
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for the protection of his colony. Second, the primary duty expected of each militiaman was merely that he enroll, arm, muster,
and attend periodic general training sessions. 4 This system hardly
qualifies as a precedent for forced conscription of a citizen for an
uninterrupted period in a regular army.
As Professor Russell F. Weigley points out, a distinction soon
developed between the "Common Militia"-the entire population
of able-bodied men-and the "Volunteer Militia" which in fact performed the functions required of an armed force:
When troops were needed for a campaign, the legislatures assigned
quotas to the local militia districts. The local officials then called
for volunteers and could impress or draft men when sufficient numbers did not come forward. Usually, compulsory service was limited
to expeditions within the colony ....
Out of these methods there naturally grew more or less permanent formations of those persons willing to volunteer for active
duty....45
The Selective Service System in its 1947 monograph The Backgrounds of Selective Service attempted to expand the Arver opinion's collection of compulsory colonial laws, citing hundreds of
statutes which it claimed were precedents for federal conscription.
But the laws show that the only element of compulsion in the
colonial militia related to mustering and training. The training
itself was often extremely lax, except in times of emergency. 46
Furthermore, most of the colonial statutes requiring periods of
actual military service rather than mere training stipulated that the
power existed only for defensive purposes. The Virginia statutes,
in case of
for example, provided that men could be raised only
47
presence.
Indian
of
knowledge
certain
upon
or
attack
Initially, most of the colonial laws restricted militia service to
duty within the colony except in emergency situations, when the
44. See, e.g., R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNrrED STATES ARMY 6 (1967):
The Massachusetts [militia] Law of 1631, passed when the colony was so new
that it was extremely insecure, called for weekly drills, to be held every Saturday. Later it seemed safe enough to drill less often, and in 1637, training days
were set at eight a year. When danger reappeared, training again intensified proportionately; there were twice-weekly drills during King Philip's War in 1675-76.
On the training days, a town's militia company generally assembled on public
grounds, held roll call and prayer, practiced the manual of arms and close order
drill, and passed under review and inspection by the militia officers and other
public officials. There might also be target practice and sham battles followed
in the afternoon-when times were not too perilous-by refreshments, games, and

socializing.
45. Id. at 8.
46. Cf. note 44 supra.
47. See SELECE SERvICE SYSTEM, 2 BACKGROUNDS OF SELECTIVE SERviCE, pt. 14, at 4,
62, 76, 145, 166, 178-79 (Special Monograph No. 1, 1947) [hereinafter BACKGROUNDS].
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governor could permit service outside the borders for limited purposes.48 In later years the laws restricted to nonfreeholders compulsory service which would lead to expeditions outside the colony.
A Virginia law passed in 175249 gave the colony power to levy
vagrants or nonvoters, but no person who had a right to vote could
be forced to serve outside Virginia. A later Virginia statute 0 also
provided that only vagrants and the unemployed could be impressed
for service beyond the borders of the colony. This restriction was
congruent with the English practice, which made the militia strictly
a county force except in time of invasion and excluded all peacetime
service outside the immediate borders of the organizing province.
The Massachusetts laws were comparable. Special legislation
was necessary to permit service outside the colony,5 1 and service
was required only against an "attempt or enterprize [at] the destruction or invasion, detriment or annoyance of our province. 852 Similarly, Soqth Carolina passed a law in 1778 permitting "all idle, lewd,
disorderly men," "sturdy beggars," and "vagrants" to go out of the
state into the Continental Army ranks to fill the state's quotas. 53
In many states personal service from each citizen was not required. Liberal laws existed which provided for either substitution
or payment of a small fine in lieu of service. For example, in
Massachusetts there were five laws passed between 1740 and 1781
allowing a man to arrange for a substitute to take his place in
the militia.54 Other states, including Connecticut, Virginia, and
New York, passed legislation providing for a small fine which freed
citizens from virtually all forms of militia service. This practice
55
became increasingly frequent in later years of the colonial period.
By the 1750's and the 1760's the need for even minimal universal
training of all the males of the colonies had receded, and the trend
was away from any kind of compulsion. No fewer than nine states
abandoned compulsory military establishments in this period. 5 The
fact that vagrants and the unemployed were swelling the ranks of
the militia, as they had filled the ranks of the British standing army
following the statute of 1756, made military service less and less
desirable. A recent commentator has noted:
48. R. WEILEY, supra note 44, at 8.
49. 2 BACKGROUNDS, pt. 14, at 123-24.
50. Id. at 186-87.
51. Id., pt. 6, at 205, 214-15.
52. Id. at 137.
53. Id., pt. 13, at 57.
54. Id., pt. 1, at 45-46.
55. See id. at 34-69.
56. Id. at 5.
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It is difficult to believe that the colonial volunteers of the eighteenth
century had more in common with the pityable recruits of the contemporary European armies than with the militia levies of an earlier
period; nevertheless, changes in the social composition of American
forces between about 1650 and 1750 were in that direction....
Perhaps the vital change was in the tone of active service: with
more social pariahs filling the ranks and military objectives less
clearly connected to parochial interests, respectable men felt not so
impelled by a sense of duty or guilt to take up arms. Only when a
war approached totality (as in the Puritan crusade to Louisbourg
in 1745, when an impressive percentage of Massachusetts manpower
57
served in the land and sea forces) might the older attitude appear.
Only during the emergency of the Revolution was this trend reversed and compulsory service reintroduced. But every effort was
made to fill the Continental Army quotas with nonvoters and nonfreeholders.
Thus, the colonial experience showed only that (1) the primary
compulsory aspect of the militia was the requirement to train; (2)
the militia was fundamentally a defensive force; (3) continuous service was required solely during periods of emergency; (4) service
outside the colony was for outcasts only; and (5) the trend was
away from compulsion in the years preceding the Revolution. It
is therefore not surprising that the Selective Service System was
obliged to admit that the "evidence reveals no preconstitutional
systems valuable as models" for a universal draft.5 8
F. Formation of the Constitution
Another proposition which the Supreme Court relied upon to
uphold the constitutionality of the draft related to the creation of
a new government in 1787. The Court noted:
When the Constitution came to be formed it may not be disputed
that one of the recognized necessities for its adoption was the want
of power in Congress to raise an army and the dependence upon
the States for their quotas. In supplying the power it was manifestly
intended to give it all and leave none to the States, since besides the
delegation to Congress of authority to raise armies the Constitution
prohibited the States, without the consent of Congress, from keeping
troops in time of peace or engaging in war.5 9
This statement, however, completely jumbles a very complicated
political process which began before the Revolution. The experi57. Shy, A New Look at the Colonial Militia, 20 Wm. & MARY Q. 175, 182-83 (3d
ser. 1963).
58. 2 BACKGROUNDS, pt. 1, at 2.

59. 245 U.S. at 381.
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ence of the nation during the war and the dangers which the Constitution-makers were concerned about cannot be telescoped in the
offhand way that the Court attempted in the Selective Draft Law
Cases. A more detailed analysis of that period is necessary.
III.

FORmULATION OF THE MILITARY CLAUSES OF THE
CONSTITUTION

A. PoliticalBackground
As noted above, widespread revulsion existed in the American
colonies against a standing professional army. Almost all of the
colonial statesmen were familiar with John Trenchard's essays, in
which he repeatedly sought to demonstrate that "unhappy Nations
have lost that precious Jewel Liberty . . . [when] their Necessities

or Indiscretion have permitted a Standing Army to be kept amongst
them." 60 The behavior of British troops in America during the ten
years before the Revolution confirmed their worst fears of this
danger. When British troops landed in Boston in 1768 Andrew
Eliot, a leading statesman, wrote: "To have a standing armyl Good
Godl What can be worse to a people who have tasted the sweets of
libertyl" 61 The Boston Massacre of 1770 and passage of the Quartering Act in 1774, which permitted the seizure of all buildings for
the use of British troops, showed the colonists how accurate
Trenchard had been. Indeed, one of the principal complaints
expressed in the Declaration of Independence was that George III
"Has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies without
the consent of our legislature," and "has effected to render the
military independent of and superior to the civil power."
As a result of the popular apprehensions about the military, the
Continental Congress imposed strict control over the army that it
organized to fight the Revolutionary War. Marcus Cunliffe, the
distinguished English historian, has recently concluded that: "[T]he
Continental Congress and the majority of Americans were sometimes more concerned with the danger of military overlordship than
the danger of military inefficiency. From a combination of doctrine
and habit they were reluctant to create their own version of a
standing army." 62 Examples of the distrust are plentiful; for instance,
the Continental Congress insisted on regular reports from its commanding officer, George Washington, appointed his staff officers, and
obliged him to consult with his generals in council before any major
60. Trenchard, supra note 32, at 7.
61. B. BAILYN, supra note 31, at 114.
62. SoLDRS AND CVMLIANS 40-41 (1968).
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military decision was made.63 Even in the midst of the war, Connecticut proposed that no peacetime army should be allowed. 64
Furthermore, throughout the Revolution, Congress was never
given any power to conscript soldiers directly into the Continental
ranks. It had to rely primarily on the militia forces of the various
states for the bulk of its fighting men. These forces were occasionally
supplemented by enlistments; in June 1775, Congress permitted the
enlistment of ten companies into the Continental Army to help
New England militia forces around Boston. Although Congress
later authorized increased musters, the enlistments, which ran generally for one year, always fell far below expectations. Short-term
enlistments seemed an unnecessary leniency in the face of the national emergency, but as Professor Weigley has observed, "the basic
cause of that policy was not Congressional folly but the caution
necessary in creating a professional army among a people who had
fled Europe partly to escape such armies."6 5
When the states were called upon for levies or quotas of troops
to meet specific campaign needs, the Continental Congress could
not even compel them to deliver the number of troops requisitioned; as might be expected, some were notoriously slow in providing manpower. George Washington suggested a direct draft system
in 1777, 1778, and 1780, but "Congress did not dare invoke that
instrument in any year of the war."66 The most that the Continental
Congress was prepared to do was to urge the states to deliver their
quotas "by draughts, or in any other manner they shall think
67
proper."
However, the states were reluctant to rely upon conscription as
a means of satisfying their congressional quotas. In part, this hesitancy may have resulted from the feeling that the state militia
systems contained safeguards for the individual which would be
vitiated when state forces were put under the control of the central
government. While the militia laws had a compulsory element in
that all the male citizens had to enroll, train, and muster, the
militiamen were usually enrolled with their friends under officers
whom they had known most of their lives. As noted above, generous
provisions existed for paid substitutes to take the place of those
63. R. WEiGLEY, supra note 44, at 30.
64. M. CUNLIEFE, supra note 62, at 41.
65. R. WEiGLEY, supra note 44, at 38.
66. Id. at 38. Professor Weigley states that "Washington ... had to recognize that
compulsory service .. . imposed on an unlucky portion of the national manpower was
a policy the country was not likely to accept." Id. at 41.
67. E. BuRuEro, THm CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 390 (1941).
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unwilling to serve, and the laws generally provided that the troops
could not be sent outside their immediate borders without the
consent of the legislature or the governor. The government leaders
who controlled the militia were also subject to close electoral check.
But none of these safeguards was present when a distant central
authority in which the state had only one of thirteen voices decided
whom or where the men had to fight. Thomas Jefferson expressed
the prevailing sentiment in the states in a letter to John Adams,
dated May 16, 1777:
Our battalions for the Continental service was sometime ago so far
filled as rendered the recommendation of a draught from the militia hardly requisite. And the more so as in this country it ever was
the most unpopular and impracticable thing that could be attempted. Our people under the monarchical68government have learnt
to consider it as the last of all oppressions.
The Continental Congress not only had to rely on the states for
quotas of troops for each campaign; it also had to come hat-in-hand
to them for money to pay for the troops it enlisted and the supplies
it required, since Congress had no power to tax.69 Each state was
obliged to pay a proportion of the general expenses, based on its
population. The states moved as slowly to supply money as they
did to furnish men for the Continental cause; by 1780, fifty million
dollars in quotas remained unpaid, and Congress was powerless to
0
demand compliance3
There was another reason why the states were not prepared to
surrender control of their individual militias to the central authorities: they wished to insure that they would have sufficient
manpower to protect their own borders. The generous bounties
offered by the states often meant that their ranks were adequate at
the same time that the Continental army was experiencing the
greatest difficulties recruiting troops. The state bounties "almost
put a stop to enlistments in the Continental Army, for few engaged
to serve three years... when by volunteering to serve in the militia
71
for a few months they received a bigger bounty and higher pay."
When the states did supply troops to the central government, they
wanted to retain direct control over their own forces even in the
field. Early in the war, for example, Samuel Adams of Massachusetts
68. 2 PAPERS OF
69. See, e.g., J.

THOMAs JEFFERSON 18 (J.Boyd ed.
ALLEN, TnE AMERICAN REvoLUTioN

1950).

216 (1954): "Taxes had come
to be associated in patriot thinking with British tyranny, and in any event Congress
lacked authority to collect them."
70. J. Mmu.m, TRIUmPH oF FREEOM: 1775-1783, at 456-59 (1948).
71. Id. at 238.
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wrote to Elbridge Gerry that "the Militia of each Colony should
be and remain under the sole Direction of its own Legislative
which is and ought to be the sovereign and uncontroulable power
within its own limits or Territory. ' 72 Gerry agreed with Adams,
and responded: "We already see the growing thirst for Power in
some of the inferior departments of the army, which ought to be
regulated so far as to keep the military entirely subservient to the
civil in every part of the United Colonies."73- This combination of
Congress' dependence on the states for men and money and the
states' constant attempts to interfere with the military authorities
nearly drove George Washington to distraction. In 1780 he wrote,
"I most firmly believe that the Independence of the United States
never will be established until there is an Army on foot for the War;
that [if we are to rely on occasional or annual levies] we must sink
74
under the expence; and ruin must follow."
Thus, the American leaders emerged from the Revolution with
four separate and conflicting ideas about organizing the military
power of the United States:
(1) Washington and other military leaders claimed that a federal, professional army, financed by the central government, had to
be maintained. 75
(2) The political leaders continued to reflect the long-established popular fear of a standing army. Samuel Adams indicated
the prevalence of this view even after the war when he wrote that
a "standing army, however necessary it may be at some times, is
always dangerous to the liberties of the people. Soldiers are apt to
76
consider themselves as a body distinct from the rest of the citizens."
(3) The states continued to see the importance of maintaining
as much control over their own militia as they possibly could.
(4) The idea of a direct draft by a central government acting
upon every citizen without the intervening authority of the state
governments was firmly and totally rejected even at the darkest
moments of the Revolution.
The experience of the new nation immediately after the Revolutionary War confirmed each of these notions. The deplorable state
of the nation's finances made the members of the army uneasy
about the bounties and pay allowances which had been promised
72. E. Burrr,supra note 67, at 107.
73. Id.
74. 20 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 113-14 (J. Fitzpatrick ed. 1937).
75. See id. at 49-50: "Regular Troops alone are equal to the exigencies of modern
No militia will ever acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force."
war ....
76. R. WEiGLEY, supra note 44, at 75.
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them. In 1783, a group of officers in New Jersey drew up a list of
complaints and hinted at mutiny if they were not fulfilled; later
the same year eighty Pennsylvania soldiers marched from Lancaster
to Philadelphia and barricaded the Continental Congress in the
State House while demanding redress of their grievances.7 7 The
apprehension that these actions caused led Congress to reduce the
federal army to fewer than one hundred men. However, because
of the need to defend the large Northwest section of the country
and to garrison the various forts in Indian territory, the army was
increased to approximately seven hundred men in 1785. When
Shays' Rebellion broke out in 1786 in western Massachusetts-near
the Springfield arsenal where the bulk of the Continental military
stores were located-the army was increased to two thousand men.
But the Massachusetts militia, and not the federal army, finally
dispersed the rebels. To George Washington, Secretary of War
Henry Knox, and others, the uprising demonstrated that the Confederation had become so feeble that it was unable to defend even
its forts and arsenals. 78
The danger of popular uprisings such as Shays' Rebellion was
one of the contributing factors leading to the call for the Constitutional Convention in the spring of 1787. But, while the weakness
of the federal authorities during the Revolution and Shays' Rebellion disturbed many of the political leaders, they did not lose their
well-established distrust of centralized government in general and of
standing armies in particular.7 9 The attempt by king and parliament
to rule from across the seas through a professional army was not to
be duplicated in the United States. Again and again during this
period the people expressed their fear of too strong a central authority; 0 the constant refrain that "the purse and the sword" were
not to be put in the same hands meant that the power to tax and
spend the public monies and an unlimited power to control the
77. Id. at 76-79.
78. See, e.g., Letter to Henry Knox, in THE WASHINGTON PAPES 229-31 (S. Padover
ed. 1958). See also R. WriGLEY, supra note 44, at 84; W. WILSON, GEORGE WASHINGTON

256 (1897).
79. See, e.g., J. MAIN, THE ANTIFDERALISTS 15 (1961):
The suspicion of a standing army and the Antifederal determination to keep in
local hands the control over the military had important consequences during and
after the Revolution. Equally important in its effects was the conviction that the
power to tax must be retained by the people. The long struggle with the governors and the decade of controversy with king and parliament re-emphasized
and intensified a doctrine shared by all Englishmen.
80. For example, the town of West Springfield, Massachusetts, reminded its representatives to guard against a Congress "which will form a design upon the liberties
of the People & [it will not be) difficult to execute such a design when they have
the absolute command of the navy, the army & the purse." Id. at 15-16.
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military should not be combined. In general, it was felt that a new
balance should be created, giving the federal authorities some
power to raise money, to establish a uniform currency, and to exercise
direct command over a small military force required for essential
tasks. But under no circumstances did the people wish to invest a
new centralized government, over which they had little control,
with the power to build up a standing army like the one that had
been the instrument of oppression before 1775.
B. The Philadelphia Constitutional Convention
The Philadelphia Convention commenced its proceedings on
May 28, 1787. The presentation of credentials, election of a chairman and adoption of rules took place on the first and part of the
second day; the main business of the Convention began on May 29
with a speech by Edmund Randolph, Governor of Virginia and
leader of the largest and most prestigious delegation. In his lengthy
discourse, he enumerated the defects of the Articles of Confederadon and commented upon the troubles then facing the separate
states, including Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts, the "havoc of
paper money," violated treaties, and commercial discord. He then
introduced a fifteen-point plan for a new federal government which
could correct these shortcomings.8 1 The Randolph or Virginia Plan
became the basis for discussing changes in the Confederation and
served as the skeleton of the new Constitution. Randolph must
therefore be considered one of the chief architects of the Constitution.
The very first defect of the government under the Articles of
Confederation, according to Randolph, stemmed from its inability
to defend itself against foreign invasion. As Madison reported his
remarks, Randolph said the following:
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: 1. that the confederation produced no security agai[nst] foreign invasion; congress not
being permitted to prevent a war not to support it by th[eir] own
authority-Of this he cited many examples; most of wh[ich] tended
to shew... that particular states might by their conduct provoke
war without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being
fit for defence on such occasions, enlistments only could be success82
ful, and these could not be executed without money.

James McHenry of Maryland took down a more complete descrip.
don of Randolph's speech. Elaborating on the enumerated defects,
81. REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 7-14, 18-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1937) [hereinafter Farrand].
82. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
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Randolph noted that the Confederation had no means of preventing
the states from provoking foreign invasion. 3 The Confederation,
he said, could not even support a war; the states were constantly in
arrears to the federal treasury, and the journals of the Continental
Congress showed that a series of feeble expedients had been employed
in the attempt to raise money for the nation's defense. He continued:
What reason to expect that the treasury will be better filled in
the future, or that money can be obtained under the present powers
of Congress to support a war. Volunteers not to be depended on for
such a purpose. Militia difficult to be collected and almost impossible to be kept in the field. Draughts stretch the strings of government too violently to be adopted. Nothing short of a regular military
force will answer the8 4end of war, and this only to be created and
supported by money.
Thus, at the very outset Randolph phrased the problem of providing an army in terms of money. Volunteer companies who would
enlist without bounties-a system urged by many leaders and included in some of the early military laws-were "not to be depended
on." Since Congress had been totally dependent on the states for
its revenues- including the money required for defense-a change
was necessary in order to give the central government sufficient
funds to support its army. The humiliating spectacle of Congress
pleading with the states for money to defend the country could not
continue; the "military force" to be raised under the new Constitution was one that had to be financed directly by the government.
But Randolph, expressing the views of the strongest Federalist delegates-those who wished to give the national government the widest
powers-excluded the power to conscript as too dangerous: it
"stretch[ed] the strings of government too violently to be adopted."
The debates in the Convention, and those that took place afterwards in the states, centered on the desirability of his fourth alternative, on "enlistments" which alone "could be successful." 8 5 The
question to which the political leaders addressed themselves was
whether federal officials should have the funds and authority to pay
for a professional volunteer army and the right to control such a
force.
Since the states had made every effort to retain command over
their militia even when the troops were fighting under the Con83. Id. at 24-25: "If a state acts against a foreign power contrary to the laws of
nations or violates a treaty, [the Confederation] cannot punish that State, or compel
its obedience to the treaty .

. .

. It therefore cannot prevent a war."

84. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 25-26.
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tinental aegis, it was important to Randolph and other Federalists
that direct control of a central army be in the hands of the new
government. And, because the states had proved so reluctant to
meet their quotas during the Revolution, it was important that the
central authorities be free to enlist their forces directly from the
people rather than being required to act through the states. But
the delegates realized that they tread on dangerous ground by suggesting the formation of such a force in peacetime. What could be
"worse to a people who have tasted the sweets of liberty" than a
standing army? However, the idea of a direct draft of citizens into
the national military was rejected on the very first day of the Convention as a matter too impossible to consider. No one-not the
stanchest Federalist in the hall-was prepared to go that far.
Following discussion of the various elements of the Randolph
Plan, which contained no specific military clause, attention focused
on the alternative scheme introduced by William Paterson of New
Jersey. It proposed that the executive "direct all military operations; provided that none of the persons composing the federal
Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so as
personally to conduct any enterprise as General or in any other
capacity."" 6 The Committee of Detail, assigned to prepare the actual
words of the new Constitution, in its fourth working draft of late
July, suggested that the new government be empowered to "make
war," "raise armies," and "equip Fleets." 87 For unknown reasons,
the seventh draft recommended that "the Legislature of U.S. shall
have the exclusive power-of raising a military Land Force-of
equipping a Navy";8 8 but the ninth draft returned to the original
phraseology, "to make war; to raise armies, to build and equip
Fleets." Shortly thereafter the Convention accepted a motion to
change "raise armies" to "raise and support armies" and "build
and equip" a navy to "provide and maintain."8' 9
At this point the Convention encountered its first real difficulties
with the Government's power to raise and support armies; the key
issue was again the historic fear of standing armies. Madison had
already warned:
A standing military force, with an overgrown Executive will not
long be safe companions to liberty. The means of defense agst.
foreign danger, have been always the instruments of tyranny at
home .... Throughout all Europe, the armies kept up under the
86. Id. at 244.
87. 2 id. at 143.

88. Id. at 158.
89. Id. at 328.
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pretext of defending, have enslaved the people. It is perhaps questionable, whether the best concerted system of absolute power in
Europe cd. maintain itself, in a situation, where no alarms of external danger cd. tame the people to the domestic yoke. 90
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts also was greatly concerned about
the military clause. He acknowledged that the chief defect under
the Articles of Confederation was the fact that the "existing Gongs.
is so constructed that it cannot of itself maintain an army." 91 But,
while many Antifederalists later advocated an absolute prohibition
on a standing army in time of peace, Gerry was prepared to grant a
limited power to Congress in this area. 92 His solution was to allow
Congress to use funds for maintaining a specific number of troops:
"He proposed that there should not be kept up in time of peace
more than
thousand troops. His idea was that the blank
should be filled with two or three thousand."'9 3 Discussion continued
with several members offering solutions to this problem, but ultimately no limit was imposed.
The Convention hedged even the limited power that it granted
to buy an army through enlistments by insisting that "no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two
years." 94 By making the army return to the people-the legislative
branch-for funds every two years, the delegates sought to minimize
the dangers of tyranny. They considered this method of control
more appropriate than a restriction on the number of troops or
a ban on any peacetime establishment.95 Later, George Mason introduced a resolution to preface the militia sections of the Constitution
with a clause stating "that the liberties of the people may be better
secured against the danger of standing armies in time of peace." 8
The motion was seconded by Randolph, and James Madison spoke

in favor of it: "It did not restrain Congress from establishing a
military force in time of peace if found necessary; and as armies
90. 1 id. at 465. George Mason of Virginia also expressed "hope there would be

no standing army in time of peace, unless it might be for a few garrisons. The
Militia ought therefore to be the more effectually prepared for the public defense."
2 id. at 326.
91. Id. at 329.
92. Cf. id.: "The people were jealous on this head, and great opposition to the
plan would spring from such an omission. . . . He thought an army dangerous in
time of peace & could never consent to a power to keep up an indefinite number."
93. Id.

94. Id. at 508.
95. Elbridge Gerry objected even to that clause since it "implied there was to be a
standing army which he inveigled against as dangerous to liberty, as unnecessary even
for so great an extent of Country as this. and if necessary, some restriction on the
number & duration ought to be provided." Id. at 509.
96. Id. at 617.
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in time of peace are allowed on all hands to be an evil, it is well to
discountenance them by the Constitution, as far as will consist with
the essential power of the Govt. on that head."9' 7 The motion,
however, did not pass.
In summary, article I, clause 12 gave Congress a power it lacked
under the Confederation-the unlimited authority to use federal
funds to enlist an army. The power was granted because, as
Randolph had observed, the militias were "difficult to be collected
and... kept in the field" and because no other alternative seemed
feasible. But the historic fears of a standing army led the delegates
to limit the power at what they considered its source-by restricting
the funds available to maintain an army. Clause 12 answered the
concern of those who wished the new government to have some
authority to keep up some kind of independent military force which
would be used for specific national purposes. But it was hardly a
blank check for the government to use all authority to raise any
forces it desired in any manner it chose. Certainly it did not grant
the power to draft; even the Federalists believed that such authority would "stretch the strings of government too violently to
be adopted."
The manner in which the militias were organized confirms the
idea that the body of state militias consisting of the citizens at large,
and not a national professional standing army, was intended to be
the main military force of the United States. When Randolph introduced the original Virginia Plan, he suggested that "the national
legislature" should have authority "to call forth the force of the
Union agst. any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty
under the articles thereof."9 8 The issue was proposed three times
with one change: "the federal Executive," said the advocates of
this modification, "shall be authorized to call forth ye power of the
Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to
enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an Observance
of such Treaties" that were passed by Congress. 99
The Convention was caught between two conflicting imperatives. On the one hand, they did not want the national authorities
to coerce citizens with a standing army; on the other hand, if the
only alternative power, the militia, were used as the primary arm of
the United States, would it not then become a mere tool of the federal government? Hamilton, indeed, had thought it desirable for
97. Id.
98. 1 id. at 21.
99. Id. at 244-45.
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"the Militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States."1 00 But this idea, never formally submitted,
was hardly acceptable. The states would not give up complete control over their own forces. The solution came in one of the many
compromises made during the Convention. The Committee of
Detail in reporting the third draft of the Constitution provided that
no state shall keep a naval or land force, "Militia excepted to be
disciplined, etc. according to the Regulations of the U.S."1 01 This
language was elaborated by James Wilson, who proposed a clause
stating that the legislature of the United States "shall possess the
exclusive Right of establishing the Government and Discipline of
the Militia-and of ordering the Militia of any State to any Place
within U.S."102 By the time that the ninth draft was completed, the
clause provided that Congress would have the power "to (make
laws for) call(ing) forth the Aid of the Militia, in order to execute
the Laws of the Union, (to) enforce Treaties, (to) suppress Insurrections, and repel invasions."1 03 With the deletion of the reference
to treaties, 10 4 this became clause 15 of article I, section 8 of the
Constitution.
In the debate on the militia power, the delegates were quite
concerned that there should be national uniformity in the regulation of the militia. 05 The matter was debated on August 18, 1787,
with Oliver Ellsworth insisting that the whole authority of the
militia should not be taken away from the states. Roger Sherman,
John Dickinson, and George Mason attempted to work out a compromise allowing the government to exercise control over a certain
portion of the Militia, one fourth to one tenth. Madison advocated
national control, arguing: "If the States would trust the Genl.
Govt. with a power over the public treasure, they would from the
same consideration of necessity grant it the direction of the public
force."' Moreover, Madison asserted, only the federal government
had a full view of the general situation and could mobilize and
100. Id. at 293.

101. 2 id. at 135.
102. Id. at 159.
103. Id. at 168.
104. It is interesting to note that after the deletion of the phrase referring to
treaties, the three instances in which the militia could be called out corresponded almost exactly to the provisions of the English Agreement of the People passed by the
House of Commons in 1648. See text accompanying notes 23-24 supra.
105. For example, General C. C. Pinckney mentioned a case that had occurred
during the war in which dissimilarity in the militia of different states "had produced
the most serious mischiefs. Uniformity was essential. The States would never keep up
a proper discipline of their militia." 2 Farrand 330.
106. Id. at 332.
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marshal the necessary forces to meet any contingency. General C. C.
Pinckney, on the basis of his military experience, had very "scanty
faith in Militia. There must be also a real military force .... The
United States had been making an experiment without it, and we
see the consequence in their rapid approaches toward anarchy," a
07
reference to Shays' Rebellion in Massachusetts the prior year. 1
Roger Sherman, however, insisted that the states would need their
own militia for defense against invasion and insurrection and for
enforcing obedience to their own laws. The matter was referred to
a select committee at that point.
The debate on the matter was resumed on August 23, 1787. The
select committee had proposed that Congress be given the power
"to make laws for organizing, arming, disciplining the Militia, and
for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service
of the U.S. reserving to the States respectively, the appointment of
the officers, and authority of training the militia according to the
discipline prescribed." 0 8 Once again Elbridge Gerry attacked the
whole notion of giving the central government power over the
militia0 9 while Madison insisted that uniformity was necessary
because the states neglected their militia. "The Discipline of the
Militia is evidently a National concern," Madison said, "and ought
to be provided for in the National Constitution.""10 The Convention passed the proposal by a vote of nine to two, agreeing to a
provision which allowed Congress "[t]o make laws for organizing
arming 8c disciplining the Militia, and for governing such part of
them as may be employed in the service of the U.S.""' During the
debate on the question whether the states should be free to appoint
officers of the militia, Madison observed:
As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is necessary to guard agst. it by sufficient powers to the Common Govt. and
as the greatest danger to liberty is from large standing armies, it is
best to prevent them by an effectual provision for a good Militia." 2
A clause allowing the states to appoint all of their officers was
passed, and, with minor changes made by the Committee on Style,
107. Id.
108. Id. at 384-85.
109. "This power in the U.S. as explained is making the States drill-sergeants. He
had as lief let the Citizens of Massachusetts be disarmed, as to take the command
from the States, and subject them to the Genl. Legislature. It would be regarded as
a system of Despotism." Id. at 385
110. Id. at 387.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 388.
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it remains in the Constitution substantially as recommended by
the Committee of Detail.113
The debate over the organization of the militia again points out
how unthinkable it was to the framers that the central government
could have any direct power to draft individual citizens into the
general army. Only with the greatest reluctance did the delegates
allow the central government to call the militia into service for
specific purposes. The reason was obvious-a tyrannical central government with a large army would be able to destroy the hard-won
liberties of the people. On the other hand, some central control was
necessary to mobilize the militia for defense purposes and to compel
obedience to the laws. But all the restrictions which the Convention
imposed on this power, the fact that the states would be able to
appoint the officers and train the militia, and the fact that the
general government could control the militia only for the purpose
of executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections, and
repelling invasions indicate that the framers were quite concerned
about the danger of the central government using its military forces
to suppress the freedoms of the people.
After circumscribing the central government's power to draw
the militia into federal service with such careful restrictions, the
delegates could not possibly have allowed the federal government to
exercise direct control over the citizens by permitting a draft into
the regular army. The matter was so impossible to imagine, given
the circumstances and ideological climate of the times, that no
voice was raised against it. The only mention of the draft at the
Convention was by Edmund Randolph, a leading Federalist figure
and proponent of the Constitution, who denied that the new government should have that power. It is inconceivable that stanch
Antifederalists like Elbridge Gerry, who strongly opposed the creation of any standing army, would not have raised the loudest protest
about any general power to draft by the federal government if they
had thought that it was contained within the general grant of
authority "to raise and support armies." All that was given by the
grant, therefore, was the power to organize and enlist a federal,
professional army which-the delegates thought-would consist of
a limited number of garrison troops. That power was given grudgingly, only in the light of the severe hardship Congress had experienced during the Revolution in depending solely on the states for
manpower and military supplies. But the door was opened for that
limited purpose only.
113. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, 1 8, d. 16.
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Differences in the language of the Constitution support this
interpretation. When the word "armies" is used in article I, section
8, it does not encompass any organized body of the military; rather,
it refers to an "army" in eighteenth century usage, a force far different from the "militia." The former existed as a highly specialized
instrument of the central government, a body of trained and disciplined troops whose purpose was to protect the central government
and execute its policies. The militia, on the other hand, was a quite
different sort of military establishment, comprehending the whole
mass of citizen-soldiers. Its principal function was to safeguard free
men against foreign and domestic enemies-not the least of which
was government itself. The idea that citizens have an obligation to
bear arms for a national authority, and work against their own
most profound interests, never occurred to the framers; it would
have been a contradiction to their entire political heritage, manifestly inconsistent with their sense of the delicate balance between
liberty and power, between the appetite for oppression and the
instinct for resistance. If the citizen had any military obligation,
it was to his local militia, where he and his compatriots might have
to meet the advance of standing armies in the employ of even their
own government.
C.

The Federalist Papers

James Madison and Alexander Hamilton devoted a substantial
portion of The Federalist Papers to the military clauses. 14 The
picture they drew of the military establishment confirms the foregoing interpretation of the structure that was delineated in the
Philadelphia Convention. In the first place, the main military force
was to be the militia; the professional army that was to be raised
and controlled by the central government had limited functions.
Hamilton's description of the English structure, which he used as
a model for the American system, is illustrative:
A sufficient force to make head against a sudden descent, till the
militia could have time to rally and embody, is all that has been
deemed requisite [in England]. ...
If we are wise enough to preserve the union, we may for ages
enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.... Extensive military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to our security." 5
Besides bearing the initial shock of any sudden invasion until the
114. See generally TnE FEm u.uisr Nos. 8, 23-29, 41.
115. THE F'mnuusr No. 8, at 48-49 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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militia could be mobilized, the regular army troops would guard
the frontiers, "against the ravages and depredations of the Indians":
These garrisons must either be furnished by occasional detachments
from the militia, or by permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged
from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed
upon, or compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent
rotation of service and the loss of labor, and disconcertion of the
industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the scheme. It would be as burthensome and injurious to
the public, as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the pay of government amounts to a standing army
in time of peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being
small.1 16
Thus Hamilton believed that the citizens at large would be enrolled in the militia while the regular army would consist of professionals enlisted for long periods. His statement is incompatible
with any notion that the citizens could be taken directly into the
regular army by a draft, "dragged from their occupations and
families" in a "frequent rotation of service" to perform "disagreeable duty" in Indian territory.
As the preceding quotation indicates, Hamilton distinguished
often between the citizens at large and the regular army. He noted
that the art of war had progressed to the point at which specialization was necessary," x7 and that the people no longer wished to devote
themselves to the military arts:
The industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed
in the pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and commerce are incompatible with the condition of a
nation of soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of
those [Greek] republics. The means of revenue, which have been so
greatly multiplied by the encrease of gold and silver, and of the arts
of industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of
modem times.... have produced an intire revolution in the system
of war, and have rendered disciplined armies, distinct from the
116. Tin F.Finmus No. 24, at 156-57 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
117. See, e.g., THE FEDERALuST No. 25, at 162 (U. Cooke ed. 1961): "The steady

operations of war against a regular and disciplined army, can only be successfully conducted by a force of the same kind... . War, like most other things, is a science to

be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice."
Madison makes the same point in THE FEDRAisT No. 41, at 270 (J. Cooke ed. 1961):
"If one nation maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of
its enterprizes to take corresponding precautions."
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body of the citizens, the inseparable companion of frequent hostility." 8

In a nation such as the United States, which was not subject to
invasions or internal strife, armies would be small and the citizens
would not be "habituated to look up to the military power for
protection, or to submit to its oppressions"; instead, they would
recognize professional armies as a necessary evil and would "stand
ready to resist a power which they suppose may be exerted to the
prejudice of their rights."" 9
Hamilton returned to this point in The Federalist No. 29, in
which he again argued that a strong militia was the best protection
against the dangers of a standing army. 20 Madison concurred in
The FederalistNo. 46:
Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country be
formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the Fcederal Government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the State
Governments with the people on their side would be able to repel
the danger. The highest number to which, according to the best
computation, a standing army can be carried in any country, does
not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or
one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not yield in the United States an army of more than
twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these would be opposed a
militia amounting to near half a million of citizens with arms in
their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence. It may well be
doubted whether a militia thus circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of regular troops.' 21
These statements show that Hamilton and Madison envisioned the
regular army that Congress could raise as a small professional force,
distinct from the citizens at large, and possessing limited functions
and responsibilities. The yeomen of the country, organized in their
militia, would be called out for the specific purposes mentioned in
the Constitution and would act as a constant check on the government and its regular army. But the idea that citizens could be im118. THE FEDERALsr No. 8, at 47 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
119. Id. at 47-48.
120. According to Hamilton, a well-trained militia "'will not only lessen the call
for military establishments; but if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude, that army can never be formidable to

the liberties of the people, while there is a large body of citizens little if at all inferior to them in discipline and the use of arms, who stand ready to defend their
own rights and those of their fellow citizens.'" At 184 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
121. At 321 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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pressed into that army against their wills is totally inconsistent with
the military structure outlined by the two Federalist leaders. No
direct comment on this question appears in The Federalist Papers
because it was entirely alien to the thinking of the time.
To both Hamilton and Madison, the problem of raising an
army was simply a matter of raising the revenue to support the
army, just as Randolph stated on the first day of the Philadelphia
Convention. 122 Since the Confederation lacked such a power, both
men wanted to be sure that the new government would have independent means of securing funds for defense and would be given
the authority to gather and support its own forces; but clearly
nothing more was supposed to be granted by the Constitution. It
is true that Hamilton was anxious to insure that the various limitations on the military power which existed under the Confederation
or were suggested at the Convention would not be imposed, and
at one point he used rather sweeping language to argue that position:
The authorities essential to the care of the common defence are
these-to raise armies-to build and equip fleets-to prescribe rules
for the government of both-to direct their operations-to provide
for their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation:
Because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety
of national exigencies, or the correspondentextent & variety of the
means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances
that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; and for this reason
no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to
which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances;
and ought to be under the direction of the same councils, which are
appointed to preside over the common defence.1 23
These remarks are often cited to show the broad reach of the war
power, and to support the assertion that this power necessarily includes the ability to conscript. However, those who rely on this
language seldom note that Hamilton explains his meaning in the
same paper. Two paragraphs after the quoted passage he states that
122. In THz FzuAsr No. 41, at 276 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), Madison wrote: "The
Power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which is to be
exerted in the national defence, is properly thrown into the same class with it." At
the beginning of Tim FaERmAST No. 30, at 187-88 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), the first paper
after his discussion of the military clause, Hamilton stated: "It has been already ob-

served that the Fcederal Government ought to possess the power of providing for
the support of the national forces; in which proposition was intended to be included

the expence of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all other expences in any wise connected with military arrangements and operations."
123. TnE FEamumr No. 23, at 147 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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"unless it can be shewn, that the circumstances which may affect
the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits"
there should be "no limitation of that authority, which is to provide
for the defence and protection of the community, in any manner
essential to its efficacy; that is in any matter essential to the formation, direction or support of the NATIONAL FORCES."' 24 In
other words, Hamilton is simply declaring that any traditional or
accepted way of forming a professional army (in terms of the
number or manner of enlisting men) or directing it (through any
command structure decided by the authorities) or supporting it
(by any system of pay scales deemed desirable) must be allowed. His
statements can be understood only as a response to the various
restrictions on a federal army suggested by the Antifederalists: a
ban on any peacetime establishment, an absolute numerical limit
on the peacetime army, or a short-term period of enlistment for
professional soldiers. These were the limitations that he wished
to avoid and his expansive language was offered to counter these
attacks on the military power. Since even the most violent Antifederalist never claimed that the new government would have the
power to conscript, 125 his statements were not directed to that
problem in any way.
The interpretation is confirmed still later in The Federalist No.
23. In denigrating the old revolutionary military system, Hamilton
argues:
We must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas and requisitions
as ... impracticable and unjust. The result from all this is, that

the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to
build and equip fleets, and to raise the revenues, which will be required for the formation and support of an army and navy, in
the customary and ordinary modes practiced in other governments.

128

By "levy[ing] troops" Hamilton meant federalizing the state militia
and bringing them into federal service by executive decree instead
of requesting the states to furnish them under the quota system.
Moreover, as stated earlier, 127 no government in the world had
exercised a general power to conscript its citizens into its regular
army-other than as punishment or as a means of removing paupers
from the streets-at the time that the Constitution was drafted.
Thus, it is clearly illogical to interpret Hamilton's statements as
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. at 147-48.
See generally text accompanying notes 128-74 infra.
At 148-49 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
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advocacy for a power beyond that which any other contemporary
government had ever asserted; at most he must have been arguing
only that the federal government should be given the same general
powers which other states possessed, the ability to use unlimited
funds to buy an army through enlistments. The juxtaposition of
his remarks about the system of quotas and requisitions with a discussion of the power to raise troops shows the intent of his statement: the federal government should be able to compel the states
to supply their militias and to enlist men directly without the
interposition of the states.
In summary, The Federalist Papers must be interpreted in
terms of the Confederation's inability to control the military and
the Antifederalist arguments which Hamilton and Madison sought
to counter. The broad language in The FederalistPapers met both
of these problems. They are answers to specific questions raised at
the time about the proper organization of the armed forces. But
both men make clear in their remarks about the function and
composition of the professional army that it would not be composed
of the citizens at large.
D.

State Ratifying Conventions

The arguments in the various state ratifying conventions also
reflect strong popular sentiment against a standing army of any
kind. Not only those attacking the Constitution but also some of
its most forceful defenders repeated the maxim that a standing
army was a potential instrument of tyranny although it was necessary to defend the nation against hostile invaders. 128 The grudging
support which the military clauses received from those who must
be regarded as its principal defenders is a good indication that
everyone expected the standing army to be a small professional
volunteer army and as Hamilton indicated, a mere holding force
until the militia could be mobilized. Further evidence that none
of the founders thought power had been granted to conscript into
a federal army is the fact that even the most vociferous Antifederalists never raised this spectre in attacking the new Constitution.-29
They objected to the federal government's power to enforce its
laws directly on the citizens of the states, to levy taxes upon them,
or to have federal courts exercise jurisdiction over them, and they
undoubtedly would have made reference to the power to conscript
if they had had any idea that such a grant of authority was written
128. E.g., THE FawDxs'r No. 41, at 271 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (Hamilton).
129. See generally text accompanying notes 128-74 infra.
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into the new instrument. The absence of any claims in this area is
strong evidence that the power was not present, since the Antifederalists drew on every conceivable source, particularly when the
military clauses were in issue, to undermine ratification.
Indeed, many of the arguments which the Antifederalists asserted against the new Constitution, and many of the amendments
which were recommended to correct alleged defects, were premised
on the implicit assumption that the power to draft did not exist.
For example, the delegates in a number of state conventions, proposed that the Constitution be amended to limit the term of
enlistments for all members of the federal army.130 If they thought
that the federal government could conscript directly, they would
surely have included a limit on the conscription term as well. In
another state some delegates wished to include a conscientious objector clause in the Constitution. But they mentioned this problem
not in connection with the power to raise a federal army but only
in discussing the militia clauses" 3 -- a clear indication of the belief
that compulsory service was possible only in the state militia. An
examination of this pattern in the various state conventions confirms
the universality of these sentiments.
1. Opposition to Standing Armies
Perhaps the most articulate attack upon the new Constitution
was made by Luther Martin, one of Maryland's delegates to the
Constitutional Convention. He delivered an address entitled "The
Genuine Information" to the Maryland legislature on November
29, 1787, describing the proceedings in Philadelphia. His report,
which ran for approximately forty printed pages in Elliot's Debates,
was the most detailed Antifederalist challenge to the new Constitution. When he addressed himself to the section of the Constitution
dealing with Congress' power to raise an army, Martin had the
following comments:
[T]he Congress have also a power given them to raise and support
armies, without any limitation as to numbers and without any restriction in time of peace. Thus, sir, this plan of government, instead of guarding against a standing army,-that engine of arbitrary
power, which has so often and so successfully been used for the subversion of freedom,-has, in its formation, given it an express and
constitutional sanction, and hath provided for its introduction. Nor
could this be prevented. I took the sense of the Convention on a
proposition, by which the Congress should not have power, in time
130. See pt. 4 infra.
131. See text accompanying note§ 163-64 infra.
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of peace, to keep imbodied more than a certain number of regular
troops, that number to be ascertained by what should be considered
a respectable peace establishment. This proposition was rejected by
a majority, it being their determination that the power of Congress
to keep up a standing army, even in peace, should only be re132
strained by their will and pleasure.
The Antifederalists in Massachusetts took a similar view, placing
particular emphasis on the danger inherent in the fact that the
new Constitution granted Congress "the power of the purse and
the sword." 133 General Thompson, a strong Antifederalist figure,
cited the English experience, saying: "Congress will have power
to keep standing armies. The great Mr. Pitt says, standing armies
are dangerous-keep your militia in order .
,,.34 And, in Pennsylvania, minority delegates who voted against ratification issued
an address declaring their "Reasons of Dissent"; one of the principal
grounds which they specified was the fear of the central government's military power:
A standing army in the hands of a government placed so independent of the people, may be made a fatal instrument to overturn
the public liberties; it may be employed to enforce the collection of
the most oppressive taxes, and to carry into execution the most arbitrary measures. An ambitious man who may have the army at his
devotion, may step up into the throne, and seize upon absolute
power.

1 35

On the other hand, the delegates in many states recognized the
need for a small peacetime standing army, primarily as a frontier
garrison force; but they frequently emphasized the limited nature
of this exception. James Iredell, a leading advocate of ratification
in North Carolina and later an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, expressed the hope that "in time of peace, there will not be
occasion, at anytime, but for a very small number of forces."' 3 6
Similarly, James Wilson of Pennsylvania supported the immediate
creation of a small federal army to guard the frontier as a means
of avoiding the possibility that a large force would be needed later;
in his view, "[o]ur enemies, finding us invulnerable, will not attack
us; and we shall thus prevent the occasion for larger standing
armies."' 137 In James Madison's opinion, however, "the most effectual
132. 1 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES 370-71 (2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter DEBATES].
133. 2 DEBATES 57: "Congress, with the purse-strings in their hands, will use the
sword with a witness."
134. Id. at 80.
135. J. McMAsTE & F. STONE, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 17871788, at 480 (1888).
136. 4 DEBATES 96.
137. 2 id. at 521.
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way" to avoid standing armies was to strengthen the state forces
and "to give the general government full power to call forth the
militia, and exert the whole natural strength of the Union."'138
In the New York ratifying convention several amendments were
proposed which indicate the kind of army that contemporary statesmen thought would be organized by the federal government. John
Lansing recommended the adoption of a clause which provided
"That no standing army, or regular troops, shall be raised, or kept
up, in time of peace, without the consent of two thirds of the members of both houses present."'139 Alexander Hamilton also proposed
an amendment that was substantially similar. 40 An amended version
of Lansing's proposal was eventually adopted by the New York
convention, 14 ' and, in a preamble to the ratifying document, the
delegates proclaimed:
[T]hat a well-regulated militia, including the body of the people
capable of bearing arms, is the proper, natural and safe defence of
a free state.
That standing armies, in time of peace, are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up, except in cases of necessity ....

1

42

Proposals to amend the Constitution by adding a prohibition on
standing armies continued even after ratification and were frequently
143
supported by Thomas Jefferson in his correspondence.
As these comments demonstrate, the leaders who ratified the
Constitution believed that the militia-the armed body of all the
citizens-was the prime source of the nation's defense, and that
only a small professional army with limited functions could be
created by the federal government. This contrast between a standing army and "the people" was often quite explicit in the debates
of the Virginia convention, 44 which were recorded more extensively
138. 3 id. at 381.
139. 2 id. at 406.

140. 5 PAPERS OF ALEXANDRM IAMILTON 185 (H. Syrett & J. Cooke ed. 1962): "That
no Appropriation of money in time of Peace for the Support of an Army shall be by
Less than two thirds of the Representatives and Senators present."
141. 1 DEBATEs 330.
142. Id. at 328.
143. See, e.g., 13 PAPERS oF THOMAS JEFFERSON 442-43 (J. Boyd ed. 1956):
I sincerely rejoice at the acceptance of our new constitution by nine states. It is
a good canvas, on which some strokes only want retouching. What these are, I

think are sufficiently manifested by the general voice from North to South, which
calls for a bill of rights. It seems pretty generally understood that this should go
to Juries, Habeas corpus, Standing armies ....

If no check can be found to keep

the number of standing troops within safe bounds ... abandon them altogether,
discipline well the militia, and guard the magazines with them. More than
magazine-guards will be useless if few, and dangerous if many ....
See also 12 id. 440; 14 id. 678.
144. See, e.g., 3 DEBATEs 425: "Mr. GEORGE MASON. ..

. I ask, Who are the

June 1969]

Conscription and the Constitution

1529

than those of any other state. James Madison made a particularly
forceful assertion of this distinction in defending the federal govern-

ment's power to call out the militia:
If resistance should be made to the execution of the laws . . . it
ought to be overcome. This could be done only in two wayseither by regular forces or by the people.... If insurrections should
arise, or invasion should take place, the people ought unquestionably to be employed, to suppress and repel them, rather than a
standing army.145
Randolph concurred in the judgment that primary military duties
should fall upon "the people" rather than a standing army; in his
interpretation of the Constitution, defense was "left to the militia,
who will suffer if they become the instruments of tyranny." 146
2. Comparison with the Military Powers of the
Confederation and Other Countries
Another indication that the Constitution did not purport to
give the federal government the power of conscription can be
found in the frequent comparisons made in state ratifying conventions between the new military system and the one established
under the Articles of Confederation. In response to the Antifederalists' expressions of apprehension about standing armies, supporters
of the Constitution argued that the military clauses were merely a
recognition of the practices of the former government; thus, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston 47 of New York, James Wilson' 48 and
Thomas McKean 4 9 of Pennsylvania, and Alexander Hamilton 5 0
militia? They consist now of the whole people, except a few public officers." See also
id. at 379, 385.

145.

Id. at 378.
146. Id. at 401.
147. 2 DEflATEs 278-79:

But, say the gentlemen, our present Congress have not the same powers. I
answer, they have the very same. Congress have the powers of making war and
peace, of levying money and raising men ....
We are told that this Constitution gives Congress the power over the purse
and the sword. Sir, have not all good governments this power? Nay, does anyone doubt that, under the old Confederation, Congress holds the purse and the
sword? How many loans did they procure which we are bound to payl How
many men did they raise whom we are bound to maintain!
148. Id. at 468: "Another objection is, 'that Congress may borrow money, keep
up standing armies and command the militia.' The present Congress possesses the
power of borrowing money and of keeping up standing armies."
149. Id. at 537: "The power of raising and supporting armies is not only necessary, but is enjoyed by the present Congress, who also judge of the expediency or
necessity of keeping them up."
150. Id. at 352: "A government, to act with energy, should have the possession
of all its revenues to answer present purposes. The principle for which I contend is
recognized in all its extent by our old Constitution. Congress is authorized to raise
troops, to call for supplies without limitation and to borrow money to any amount."
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all asserted that the power to control the purse and the sword which
was granted by the new instrument was essentially the same as that
existing in the Confederation. That is, many defenders of the Constitution felt that the answer to the problem of national defense
lay in the explicit grant of power to raise money for enlisting an
army, and not in any system so radical as direct conscription into
the federal forces. This distinction is particularly clear in James
Wilson's discussion of Shays' Rebellion:
It may be frequently necessary to keep up standing armies in time
of peace. The present Congress have experienced the necessity, and
seven hundred troops are just as much a standing army as seventy
thousand. ... They may go further, and raise an army, without
communicating to the public the purpose for which it is raised.
On a particular occasion they did this. When the commotion existed in Massachusetts, they gave orders for enlisting an additional
body of two thousand men.151
In addition to comparing the new government's authority to
that of the old Confederation, some delegates also claimed that the
military power of the United States was to be the same as that
practiced by other nations-and, as noted above, 152 no nation practiced conscription at the time that the Constitution was adopted.
Thus, when Thomas Dawes of Massachusetts cited the English experience with standing armies under Charles II, James II, and
William III as support for the proposition that national legislatures
have the inherent authority "to raise armies,"' 153 he must have been
referring to the kind of professional volunteer army which Great
Britain maintained throughout the eighteenth century. James Wilson's analogy to foreign governments also underscores what the
delegates meant when they passed upon the power to "raise and
support armies": "I have taken some pains to inform myself how
the other governments of the world stand with regard to this power,
and the result of my inquiry is, that there is not one which has
not the power of raising and keeping up standing armies."'5 4
3. Amendments on Military Jurisdiction
The possibility that citizens could be tried by courts-martial
was of central concern to many statesmen of the time who thought
that trial by jury was the individual's greatest safeguard against
tyranny. Luther Martin, the Maryland Antifederalist, expressed
considerable concern over this problem, but he mentioned it only
151. Id. at 520-21.
152. See text accompanying notes 19-21 supra.
153. 2 DEBATs 97-98.

154. Id. at 520.
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with respect to the militia clause, and not in connection with the
provision for federal armies:
It was thought that not more than a certain part of the militia of
any one state ought to be obliged to march out of the same ... at
any one time, without the consent of the legislature of such state.
This amendment I endeavored to obtain; but . . . it was not
adopted. As it now stands, the Congress will have the power, if they
please, to march the whole militia of Maryland to the remotest part
of the Union, and to keep them in service as long as they think
proper, without being in any respect dependent upon the government of Maryland for this unlimited exercise of power over its
citizens--all of whom, from the lowest to the greatest, may, during
such service, be subjected to military law, and tied up and whipped
.. like the meanest of slaves.155
According to Martin, who was a delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, it was the federal government's power to call out the militia
that created the danger of military control over Maryland citizens;
he did not even mention this problem when he discussed the congressional power to raise and support armies. It seems probable
that his failure to mention the issue in the latter context was due
to the unarticulated assumption that the regular army would be
composed of volunteers who would waive their right to jury trial
by enlisting.
It is apparent that the members of the Maryland convention
shared Martin's assumption, for they proposed an amendment providing "That the militia shall not be subjected to martial law,
except in time of war, invasion or rebellion."1' 56 According to the
Amending Committee:
This provision to restrain the powers of Congress over the militia,
although by no means so ample as that provided by the Magna
Carta and the other great fundamental and Constitutional laws of
Great Britain ...yet it may prove an inestimable check; for all
other provisions in favor of the rights of men would be vain and
nugatory, if the power of subjecting all men, able to bear arms, to
martial law at any moment should remain vested in Congress. 157
A similar amendment was proposed in Virginia.5 8 It hardly seems
possible that the delegates in these two states would be concerned
about the danger that state citizens forced into the militia could
155. 1 id. at 371.
156. 2 id. at 552.
157. Id.
158. 3 id. at 660:
That each state respectively shall have the power to provide for organizing, arming, and disdplining its own militia, whensoever Congress shall omit or neglect
to provide for the same. That the militia shall not be subject to martial law,
except when in actual service, in time of war, invasion or rebellion ....
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be subject to martial law, but would completely ignore the fate of
state citizens conscripted directly into a national army. Rather, the
conclusions seems inescapable that the Maryland and Virginia
delegates believed that the militia clauses constituted the sole
mechanism by which unwilling citizens could be brought under the
jurisdiction of the federal military apparatus.
4. Amendments on Term of Enlistment
In addition to the amendment concerning military jurisdiction,
the Maryland convention proposed several other limitations on the
military power. Two of these amendments provided that soldiers
could not be quartered in private houses and that no mutiny bill
could continue in force longer than two years; a third stipulated
that "no soldier be enlisted for a longer time than four years, except
in time of war, and then only during the war."15 9 Amendments
which were virtually identical to the latter provision were also
introduced in North Carolina 60 and Virginia. 61
According to the proponents of the Maryland amendments, the
three limitations on the federal government were necessary because
"[t]hese were the only checks that could be obtained against the
unlimited power of raising and regulating standing armies, the
natural enemies of freedom.' 62 But surely the amendment limiting
terms of enlistment would be a failure in achieving this objective
if the federal government had the power to conscript citizens for
unlimited periods of time. Again, the conclusion seems inescapable
that the delegates who proposed these limitations on the central
government's military powers never imagined that the new Constitution granted Congress the greater power of direct conscription.
5. Proposals Concerning Conscientious Objectors
Since many Pennsylvania citizens were Quakers who opposed
military service in any form, that state's convention was forced to
deal with the problem of conscientious objection. Thomas McKean
discussed this problem; but, significantly, he referred to conscientious objection only in the context of the federal government's
control over the militia, and not in relation to Congress' power to
raise and support armies.'6 The minority report issued by the
159. 2 DmATms 552.

160. 4 id. at 245.
161. 3 id. at 660.

162. 2 id. at 552.
163. Id. at 537: "It is objected that the powers of Congress are too large, because
'they have the power of calling for the militia on necessary occasions, and may call
them from one end of the continent to the other, and wantonly harass them; besides,
they may coerce men to act in the militia whose consciences are against bearing
arms in any case."'
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Pennsylvania Antifederalists was also quite explicit in condemning
the incursions on individual liberty that were possible under the
militia clause:
The absolute unqualified command that Congress have over
the militia may be made instrumental to the destruction of all
liberty ....
First, the personal liberty of every man, probably from sixteen
to sixty years of age, may be destroyed by the
power Congress have
164
in organizing and governing of the militia.
The Pennsylvania dissenters did not mention the threat to "the
personal liberty of every man" in connection with the federal government's power to raise armies; in their view, apparently, the
only compulsory military service contemplated by the Constitution
was through the state militias. The minority delegates advanced
another objection:
Secondly, the rights of conscience may be violated, as there is no
exemption of those persons who are conscientiously scrupulous of
bearing arms. These compose a respectable proportion of the community in the state ....
[During the Revolution] the framers of our State Constitution
made the most express and decided declaration and stipulations in
favor of the rights of conscience; but now, when no necessity exists,
those dearest rights of men are left insecure. 165
The Pennsylvania dissenters' failure to relate the problem of conscientious objection to the provision for a standing army is easily
explained by hypothesizing their belief that the regular army would
be composed solely of volunteers who obviously would have no
scruples about bearing arms.
6. FinancialAspects of the Military Power
The contemporary identification of "the power of the purse and
the power of the sword" served to focus the attention of many state
delegates upon the government's financial ability to support an
army, and those who believed in the need for a strong system of
national defense often asserted that Congress should be able to
raise substantial sums of money quickly in the event of invasion or
other emergency. 66 As a corollary to this proposition, however, proponents of a strong central government believed that the Congress
164. J. MCMzRa & F. STONE, supra note 135, at 480.
165. Id. at 480-81.
166. See, e.g., 2 DEBA'rEs 66-67 (remarks of Christopher Gore of Boston): "Is
America to wait until she is attacked, before she attempts a preparation at defense?
This certainly would be unwise; it would be courting our enemies to make war upon
us. The operations of war are sudden, and call for large sums of money." See also id.
at 68, 189, 191.
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would need financial power in order to buy an army through enlistments. Thus, James Wilson of Pennsylvania asked rhetorically:
Have not the freest of governments those powers [of the sword and
the purse]? And are they not in the fullest exercise of them? ...
Can we create a government without the power to act? How can it
act without the assistance of men? And how are men to be procured without being paid for their services? 16
On the other hand, Antifederalist Richard Henry Lee opposed
granting the national government unrestricted power to "engage
officers and men for any number of years"; it was his fear that "[w]e
shall have a large standing army as soon as the monies to support
them can possibly be found."'168 "An army is not a very agreeable
place of employment," he added, "for the young gentlemen of many
families"; 69 apparently he was concerned that those who would be
attracted to a professional army would be insensitive to the values
of liberty.
Some delegates also were apprehensive about the impact that
compulsory militia service would have upon the civilian economy.
Since the vast majority of citizens were farmers by occupation, a call
of the militia during the planting or harvesting season could cause
great hardship. Thus, Edmund Randolph, 70 Henry Lee, 17 and
Francis Corbin supported a professional army that would promote
a more appropriate division of labor. Corbin argued to the Virginia
convention:
If some of the community are exclusively inured to its defence, and
the rest attend to agriculture, the consequence will be, that the arts
of war and defence, and of cultivating the soil, will be understood ....

If, on the contrary, our defence be solely intrusted to

militia, ignorance of arms and negligence of farming will ensue....
If we are called in the time of sowing seed, or of harvest, the means
of subsistence might be lost; and the loss of one year's crop might
have been prevented by a trivial expense, if appropriated to the
purpose of supporting a part of the community, exclusively occupied
2
in the defence of the whole.17
Thus in the eyes of Corbin, Lee, and Randolph, regular troops167. 2 id. at 522.
168. Letters from the FederalFarmer to the Republican (Letter No. III), in EssE.NTIAL WORKS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 282 (L. Kriegel ed. 1964).

169. Id. at 282-83.
170. 3 DEBATEs 77: "The militia of our country will be wanted for agriculture
....
It must be neglected if those hands which ought to attend to it are occasionally
called forth on military expeditions."
171. See id. at 177. Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee should not be confused
with his cousin Richard Henry Lee (see text accompanying note 168 supra). For
biographies of the two men, see 11 DirIONARY OF AmEmCAN BIOGRA1HY 107, 117 (D.
Malone ed. 1933).
172. 3 DEBATES 112-13.
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"a part of the community, exclusively occupied in the defense of the
whole"-would take the military burden off the militia-the yeomen of the country who would devote themselves to agriculture and
the mechanic arts. In their view, the farmers-the citizens at large
-could not be forced into the regular army. In that case men
would be called out at sowing time or at the harvest, which all three
men saw as dangerous to agricultural industry. Wilson Nicholas
discerned another economic reason for relying upon a professional
volunteer army. Even if the militia were adequate for national defense, he contended, reliance on state forces imposed an unequal
burden upon the poor. "If war be supported by militia," he argued,
"it is by personal service. The poor man does just as much as the
rich. Is this just?" Moreover, the rich man could easily exempt himself by finding a substitute. But if the military duties were entrusted
to a regular army, Nicholas said, the soldiers would be "paid by
taxes raised from the people, according to their property; and then
the rich man pays an adequate share."' 7 3 Thus, according to Nicholas, when regular troops were used to carry on a war, personal service by the poor would not be required; professional soldiers would
be used, paid for by taxes. This argument strikes an ironic note in
light of current debates upon the desirability of a volunteer army; 174
but the clear import of the delegates' discussion of economic factors
is that the regular army was viewed by all parties as a professional
force procured by enlistments, not by forced service of the people.
E. Early Congresses and the Military Power
The actions of the first Congresses elected under the Constitution,
which included many of the delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, support the view that conscription was not authorized by the
Constitution. One of the most important items of business confronting the first Congress was, of course, the promulgation of a Bill of
Rights, and, in June of 1789, James Madison introduced a series of
proposed amendments to the Constitution. One of these, which
eventually became the second amendment, stated:
The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well-armed and well-regulated militia being the best
security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of
bearing arms shall be compelled to render military service in
person. 75
173. Id. at 389.
174. See, e.g., G. RPy.y, WHO WiLL Do OUR FIGHnNG FOR Us? 56 (1969): "'When
we say 'volunteer army' we are really saying an army composed of the poor and the
black."
175. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 1st Cong., 434 (1834).
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The fact that Madison sought to insert a conscientious-objector
clause into the Constitution indicates the significance he ascribed
to freedom of conscience; yet, his proposed objector clause dealt
only with the militia power. It seems difficult to believe that he
would seek to limit the militia's power to compel service in this
manner and ignore a comparable power in the federal government,
if there was any serious possibility that the federal government
could conscript citizens. Like the other statesmen of the time, he
apparently thought that compulsory military service could take
place only in the militia, and that was the only area about which he
concerned himself.
Opponents of Madison's conscientious-objector clause argued
that the problem was too difficult and uncertain to be dealt with by
an inflexible constitutional provision, 176 and the clause was finally
eliminated in September 1789 by the Senate.177 However, the second
amendment that was finally adopted emphasizes once again the
sharp distinction that was made between the militia and the regular
army at the time the Constitution was adopted. The amendment's
assertions that the militia was "necessary to the security of a free
state" and that "the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed" can be traced to the Virginia ratifying convention. There, George Mason had argued that the federal government
might "neglect" or "harass and abuse" the militia "in order to have
the pretense of establishing a standing army."' 1 8 Patrick Henry had
agreed; in his opinion, the "militia .

.

. is our ultimate safety. We

can have no security without it."'179 Thus, the people organized in
the state militias were regarded as a counterforce against the threat
that the regular army could be used as an instrument of oppres176. See, eg., id. at 751 (remarks of Representative Benson of New York):
If this stands part of the Constitution, it will be a question before the Judiciary
on every regulation you make with respect to the organization of this militia
. . . . It is extremely injudicious to intermix matters of doubt with fundamentals.
I have no reason to believe but the Legislature will always possess humanity
enough to indulge this class of citizens in a matter they are so desirous of; but
they ought to be left to their discretion.
177. See E. DUmBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 46 n.9
(1957). There was strong sentiment in the House for the provision. Elias Boudinot,
once President of the Continental Congress and in 1789 a Representative from New
Jersey, defended the conscientious-objector clause. "In forming a militia," he said "an
effectual defence ought to be calculated, and no characters of this religious description ought to be compelled to take up arms." He added that "by striking out the
clause, people may be led to believe that there is an intention in the General Govern-

ment to compel all its citizens to bear arms." 1 ANNALS

OF CONGRsSS,

1st Cong., 767. Of

course, since the clause in question related only to the militia, Boudinot's statements
would make no sense if Congress had the power to conscript. For in that case the
general government would be able "to compel all its citizens to bear arms," a power
which Boudinot was denying.
178. 3 DEBATEs 379.
179. Id. at 385.
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sion,18 0 and service in the militia was a right of the citizen that

could not be transgressed by the federal government. 81 Clearly, this
balance of power could be upset, and the citizen's right to bear arms
in the militia undermined, if the federal government had the power
to compel large numbers of citizens to serve in the regular army.
Congress moved quickly to implement the military sections of
the Constitution. At the instigation of Secretary of War Knox, a
statute was passed in September of 1789 legalizing the existence of
the 840-man army inherited from the Confederation; 8 2 about six
months later the authorized force was increased to over a thousand
men.ls 3 The statutes dearly dealt only with enlisted forces, but in
spite of this fact, there was substantial opposition in Congress to the
84
creation of a standing army.
The size of the regular army was increased twice more during
the next two years,""; and in May of 1792 Congress passed a uniform militia law.'8 6 The latter provision had developed from a plan
proposed by Secretary of War Knox in 1790 which would have
obliged every male citizen to enroll and train for specific periods in
a federally organized militia system. A select part of the militiathe "advanced corps" of younger men-would be extensively
trained and ready for service on short notice. Congressional opposition to this proposal proved insurmountable,8 7 and, after two years
180. Cf. R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY 87 (1967): "It was possible to regard the state militias as a check against a federal standing army, since they
had just accomplished a very similar purpose: they had given birth to the Continental
Army to check the threat of military despotism from the British army."
181. Thus, Antifederalist Elbridge Gerry had argued against the inclusion of
Madison's conscientious-objector clause in the Bill of Rights on the ground that
Congress could declare large numbers of citizens religiously scrupulous "and thus
prevent them from bearing arms" in the militia. 1 ANNALS OF CONGREss, 1st Cong.,
749-50 (1834).
182. Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 25, 1 Stat. 95.
183. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 119.
184. On March 30, 1790, Senator William Maclay confided to his diary:
This bill seems laying the foundation of a standing army. The justifiable reasons
for using force seem to be the enforcing of law, quelling insurrections, and repelling invasions. The Constitution directs all these to be done by militia. Should
the United States, unfortunately, be involved in war, an army for the annoyance

of our enemy in their own country, (as the most effective mode of keeping the
calamity at a distance . . . ) will be necessary.

Tim JOURNALS OF WITLIAM MACLAY 221 (E. Maclay ed. 1965). It is interesting to note
that Maday's conception of a foreign expeditionary force is an extension of Hamilton's
idea that the regular army would serve only as a frontier garrison and as a holding
force to permit time for mobilization of the militia in the event of invasion; see text
accompanying notes 115-16 supra.
185. Act of March 3, 1791, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 222; Act of March 5, 1792, ch. 9, 1 Stat.
241.
186. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, 1 Stat. 271.
187. Thomas Fitzsimons of Pennsylvania, a member of the Philadelphia Convention, asked "whether it would be the most eligible mode to subject all the citizens
. . . to turn out as soldiers. A much smaller number would, in his opinion, answer
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of consideration, Congress passed a law which required enrollment
but did not specify any particular duration or type of training for
the militia; these matters were left entirely to the states. Perhaps
the most significant aspect of the episode is the fact that Knox, the
foremost advocate of a strong military system, sought to establish
compulsory universal military training not under the Constitutional
grant of power to raise and support armies, but under the militia
clause.
The early debates on the military also reflect a perception by
many congressmen that their control over the militia was secondary to the states' regulatory power. Thus, one representative asserted that "the States alone are to say of what description of persons
the militia shall consist, and who shall be exempt from militia duty;
Congress have only power to organize them, when thus desig18
nated."
Questions about the proper size and composition of the military
establishment were before Congress frequently during the early
years of the Republic, particularly with regard to the kind of force
that should be used to fight the Indians. Those who advocated the
use of regular troops emphasized the adverse impact on agriculture
that would result from use of the militia,189 or the unreliability of
poorly trained militiamen; 190 others contended that the regular
troops were "trash" who "enlist for three dollars a month; which,
in a country like the United States, is a sufficient description of
their bodies as well as their minds."' 91 When the Whiskey Rebellion erupted in 1794, it was the militia that was summoned to
suppress it; Washington called out 12,000 militiamen from four
states, and maintained a peacekeeping force of 2,500 in the area
after order was restored.192 Early Congresses also depended heavily
on militia groups entering the federal service of their own choice.
These volunteer units had a long tradition dating from the colonial
period; frequently they furnished their own arms and elaborate uniall the purposes of a militia." 2 ANNALS OF CONGR.SS 1805 (1790). Elias Boudinot
agreed that there was "a manifest propriety in the measure." Id. In his diary, Maclay
wrote: "General Knox offers a most exceptional bill for a general militia law which
excites (as it is most probable he expected) a general opposition." THE JOURNALS
OF WILLIAM MACLAY 235 (E. Maday ed. 1965).
188. ANNALS OF CONCRESS, 2d Cong., 419 (1849) (remarks of Representative Sturges).
Congressman Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire concurred. "It is a militia of the
several States that Congress have power to organize, and provide a mode of discipline
for. It is not a militia to be formed, or created-it already exists. He therefore
thought it best to leave it to the respective States to make their own militia laws." Id.
189. Id. at 775-76.
190. Id. at 779.
191. Id. at 796.
192. Congress authorized these actions. Act of Nov. 29, 1794, ch. 1, 1 Stat. 403.
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forms, and were composed of social elites. 193 In 1794194 and 1798,19'5
Congress authorized the President to accept volunteer militia units,
but the statutes maintained a distinction between these groups and
the troops obtained by regular enlistments.
Thus, in the first ten years of the nation Congress evidenced its
understanding of the military powers granted in the Constitution
by: (1) debating a constitutional amendment on conscientious objection which focused on the militia as the only compulsory military force; (2) passing the second amendment, which was totally
incompatible with any notion of federal conscription; (3) grudgingly increasing the size of its regular, enlisted army; (4) passing a
tepid militia law because it did not wish to compel the citizens to
train in the militia; and (5) distinguishing between the "trash" of
the regular army and the industrious yeoman of the militia. At no
time during this period-not even during the quasi-war with France
in 1797-1800-was there the slightest hint that Congress might
have the power to enforce direct conscription.
F. The RelationshipBetween the Militia
and the Regular Army
In the Selective Draft Law Cases, the Supreme Court placed
considerable reliance on the relationship between the militia and
the regular forces. The Court opened this phase of its argument by
citing the portion of article I, section 10 which prohibits the states
from keeping "Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace" without
the consent of Congress. This provision, together with the difficulties experienced by the Continental Congress in trying to get the
states to meet their troop quotas and the grant of power to raise
armies, led the Court to infer that the framers had intended to vest
all the military powers in Congress. 9 6 Therefore, Chief Justice
White concluded, "[t]here was left ...

under the sway of the States

undelegated the control of the militia to the extent that such
control was not taken away by the exercise by Congress of its power
197
to raise armies.'
193. See, e.g., R. WEIGLEY, supra note 180, at 8.
194. Act of May 9, 1794, ch. 27, 1 Stat. 367.

195. Act of May 28, 1798, ch. 47, 1 Stat. 558.
196. 245 U.S. at 382:
The right on the one hand of Congress under the Confederation to call on the
States for forces and the duty on the other of the States to furnish when called,
embraced the complete power of government over the subject. When the two
were combined and were delegated to Congress all governmental power on that
subject was conferred, a result manifested not only by the grant made but by
the limitation expressly put upon the States on the subject. The army sphere
therefore embraces such complete authority.
197. 245 US. at 383.
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It is undoubtedly true that the military clauses of the Constitution were designed in part to remedy the central government's lack
of power under the Articles of Confederation; Alexander Hamilton's belief that a permanent military corps was needed to perform
duties for which the militia was inappropriate 198 and his argument
that sole reliance on the states for national defense could lead to unequal burdens or disastrous rivalries' 99 clearly weighed heavily with
those who assisted in drafting the Constitution. But these acknowledged facts hardly support the conclusion that Congress' power to
raise and support armies extended to all attributes of state militia
power, including the authority to conscript. Rather, the available
historical evidence indicates that the Supreme Court in Arver did
not pursue the distinction between the militia power and the army
power far enough, and that the framers did not view the state militias
and the federal army as simply complementary manifestations of the
same power.
It is clear that the framers imposed no specific limitations on
how the federal government could use its regular forces; in the
opinion of some early statesmen, they could even be sent abroad to
fight in foreign wars. 200 At the same time, the militia could be used
only for the limited purposes enumerated in the Constitution, and
the states could not maintain regular forces on duty. This differential treatment of the uses to which the army and the militia could
be put provides a marked contrast to the prevailing understanding
of how the manpower could be raised for each force. The fact that
the states could compel militia service did not mean that Congress
would have equivalent power with respect to the army. As the preceding discussion of the Philadelphia Convention, The Federalist
Papers,and the state ratifying conventions indicates, the contemporary understanding was that the regular army would be composed
of volunteers who could not legitimately object if they were exposed to the dangers of questionable domestic conflicts or foreign
entanglements. Indeed, the fact that various restrictions were imposed upon the use of the militia reflects the framers' belief that
the citizens should not be taken into the army against their wills
and employed in any military venture that the federal government
might undertake. Thus, if the Court in the Selective Draft Law
Cases had been more sensitive to the historical context in drawing
inferences from the constitutional distinction between the militia
and the regular army, it would not have concluded that every
198. Tom FEDERALisT No. 24, at 156-57 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
199. T-E FEDERALIsT No. 25, at 158-59 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
200. See note 184 supra.
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attribute of one forc necessarily attached to the other. Instead,
history points to the conclusion that the framers gave the federal
government wide powers to use its army but not to gather it, while
the militia's functions were specified but its manpower source was
unlimited.
IV. TnE

NATION'S MILITARY HISTORY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

A. The War of 1812
A major portion of the Court's opinion in the Selective Draft
Law Cases dealt with the federal government's attempts to implement universal conscription after the adoption of the Constitution.
The first significant attempt to enact a draft law occurred during
the War of 1812, according to the Court, "[e]ither because [the
existing regular army and militia force] proved to be weak in numbers or because of insubordination developed among the forces
called and manifested by their refusal to cross the border. 20 1 In
response to these pressures, Secretary of War Monroe introduced a
plan to "call a designated number out of the population between
the ages of 18 and 45 for service in the army."20 2 The Court conceded that congressional opposition against the bill developed, but
states that "we need not stop to consider it because it substantially
rested upon the incompatibility of compulsory military service with
free government, a subject which from what we have said has been
'2 3
disposed of."
In this manner, the Court blithely dismissed the most significant
aspect of the Monroe Plan: not the fact that it was introduced, but
the fact that Congress never passed the proposal because a substantial number of congressmen did not believe that the federal
government had power to conscript. Senator Christopher Gore's
assertion that the plan "never will and never ought to be submitted
to by this country, while it retains one idea of civil freedom" 204 was
representative of the tenor of remarks made by those who opposed
conscription, 20 5 and came with particular force from a man who had
been a strong proponent of the Constitution in the Massachusetts
201. 245 U.S. at 384.
202. 245 US. at 385.

203. 245 US. at 385.
204. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, 13th Cong., 3d Sess., 100 (1854).
205. Senator David Daggett of Connecticut opposed the bill because "it is utterly
inconsistent with principles [of civil liberty] to compel any man to become a soldier
for life, during a war, or for any fixed time. In Great Britain, a war-like nation ...
no such practice is, or can be, resorted to; the people would revolt at it . . . . It is
alike odious here, and I hope it will remain so." Id. at 72. Similarly, Robert Goldsborough of Maryland challenged his fellow senators, saying "you dare not ... attempt
a conscription to fill the ranks of your regular army." Id. at 107.
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ratifying convention. Several congressmen made more detailed attacks upon the proposal. Senator Jeremiah Mason of New Hampshire addressed himself to the specific problem of "whether the
Constitution gives to this Government the power contended for,"
and found several grounds for concluding that it did not. In the
first place, he observed, nothing in the Constitution imposed limits
upon the sweeping power that the Government sought:
The power claimed is, doubtless, vastly greater and more dangerous
than any other possessed by the Government. It subjects the personal freedom of every citizen, in comparison with which the rights
of property are insignificant, to arbitrary discretion. Had there been
the intention of granting such power, would there not have been
some attempt to guard against the unjust and oppressive exercise
of it, as was done in the granting of power of less importance?20
Furthermore, Mason argued, the constitutional grant of power "to
provide and maintain a navy" could equally support the implication of a power to conscript, and the manpower need was, if anything, greater in the naval service; yet the government was not seeking the power to conscript for the navy. Indeed, Mason pointed out:
The British Government, before the Revolution did attempt to
exercise in this country the supposed right of impressment for the
Navy, which it never did for the Arm..... Yet the Government, in
their instructions to our Envoys for treating of peace with Great
Britain, say "impressment is not an American practice but it is
utterly repugnant to our Constitution and laws." The honorable
Secretary [Monroe] when he drafted those instructions, knew not
how soon
he should be directed to contend for the contrary doc07
trine.
The most eloquent attack on the Monroe Plan was made by
Daniel Webster, who addressed the House of Representatives on
December 9, 1814. First, he noted, the proposal went beyond the
acknowledged power to call out the militia according to its existing
organization; it was, in effect, a plan to raise "a standing army out
of the militia by draft." 208 Therefore, Webster stated, "The question is nothing less than whether the most essential rights of personal liberty shall be surrendered, and despotism embraced in its
worst form." 20 9 He then proceeded to ask:
Is this, sir, consistent with the character of a free government? Is
this civil liberty? Is this the real character of our Constitution? No,
sir, indeed it is not. The Constitution is libelled, foully libelled.
206. Id. at 80.
207. Id. at 81.
208. 14 THE Wz'rINGS
209. Id.

AND SPEECHES OF DANEL

WEBBsrm 57 (1903).
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The people of this country have not established for themselves such
a fabric of despotism. They have not purchased at a vast expense of
their own treasure and their own blood a Magna Charta to be
slaves. XVhere is it written in the Constitution . . . that you may
take children from their parents, and parents from their children,
and compel them to fight the battles of any war in which the folly
or the wickedness of government may engage it?210
Webster then turned his attention to the source of the power to
conscript "which now for the first time comes forth . . to trample
down and destroy the dearest rights of personal liberty .... -211 The
Government's claim of constitutional power was summarily dismissed: "I almost disdain to go to quotations and references to
prove that such an abominable doctrine has no foundation in the
Constitution of the country. It is enough to know that the instrument was intended as the basis of a free government, and that the
power contended for is incompatible with any notion of personal
liberty." 212 Nor, argued Webster, could the Secretary of War justify
his plan by saying that Congress could raise armies by any means
not prohibited by the Constitution, and that "the power to raise
would be granted in vain" if there were insufficient enlistments. "If
this reasoning could prove anything," Webster retorted, "it would
equally show, that whenever the legitimate power of the Constitution should be so badly administered as to cease to answer the great
ends intended by them, such new powers may be assumed or
'213
usurped, as any existing administration may deem expedient.
This strong opposition made passage of the Monroe Plan a practical impossibility. John C. Calhoun, then a young representative
from South Carolina, summarized the alternatives that were available to the federal government: "[T]he military force by which we
can operate consists of . . . the regular force, whose general character is mercenary, the soldiers enlisting for the sake of bounty and
subsistence; draughted militia called into the field by patriotic motives only." 21 4 Congress eventually settled upon a plan under which
volunteer militia units could enlist for specific short periods; if
they engaged to serve for more than nine months, the volunteers
could receive acreage from the public lands instead of monthly
pay. 21 5 The threat of a system of federal conscription, however, had
repercussions even outside the Congress. In January of 1815, rep210. Id. at 61.
211. Id.

212. Id. at 62.
213. Id. at 63-64.
214. ANNALS oF CoNmREss, 13th Cong., 3d Sess., 531 (1854).
215. See SELcmTIVE SFRWvi SYstmm, 3 THE SE Icnv SF.Rvim
Monograph No. 2, 1954).
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resentatives of various New England states that were opposed to the
war met at the Hartford Convention. One of the resolutions which
they passed recommended that the states "adopt all such measures
as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of said states"
against acts of Congress "which shall contain provision, subjecting
the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not authorized by the 'constitution of the United
States,' "216 Thus, a substantial group of influential political leaders,
within three decades after the Constitution was ratified, vigorously
asserted that the federal government did not have the power of
direct conscription; yet the Arver Court, in a single sentence, dismissed their arguments as irrelevant.
B. The Civil War
A final major point relied upon by the Supreme Court in the
Selective Draft Law Cases was the use of direct conscription during
the Civil War. Chief Justice White noted that early in the war the
Union government relied upon militia and volunteers; when more
men were required, however, a draft law was proposed and
passed.217 There is some doubt as to whether the true purpose of the
Civil War Enrollment Act was to procure men through conscription; it seems equally possible that, as one historian has asserted, the
measure was designed merely to stimulate enlistments in the regular
army.21 8 In any event, it is clear that even during the exigencies of
the Civil War, a large segment of the populace actively opposed the
draft.
The act was quite lenient by today's standards; for example, a
drafted man could hire a substitute to perform his service for him,
216. A. FRsuD,

THE

JEFFERSONIAN

AND

HAMILTONIAN

TRADITION

IN

AMERICAN

Po=cs 98 (1968).

217. 245 U.S. at 386:
By [the Act of March 8, 1863, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 781.1, which was clearly intended
to directly exert upon all the citizens of the United States the national power
which it had been proposed to exert in 1814 . . . every male citizen of the
United States between the ages of twenty and forty-five was made subject by
the direct action of Congress to be called by compulsory draft to service in a
national army at such time and in such numbers as the President in his discretion might find necessary.
218. 1 F. SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION

OF THE UNION ARMY,

1861-1865, at 308 (1928):
Very dearly the law was never intended as a direct procurer of men but merely
as a whip in the hands of the federal government to stimulate state activities.
Even the name of conscription was avoided by its friends who always spoke of
it as the "enrollment bill." Only its enemies called it a "conscription bill," which
term was considered by the administration men as an unfair epithet. But they
knew whereof they spoke for, as they shaped it, the bill was not a conscription
bill in any general sense; it was merely a piece of class legislation designed . . .
merely to stimulate mercenary establishments and to match the rich man's dollars with the poor man's life. None would have been more horrified than Henry
Wilson [the act's author] at the suggestion that every able-bodied man drafted
should be compelled to serve ....
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or could purchase outright commutation from the draft.2 19 Nevertheless, popular sentiment against conscription was so strong that
protest riots occurred in many cities throughout the country. The
largest disturbance, which took place in New York City, resulted in
an estimated 1,200 deaths and millions of dollars in property damage. Fifteen regiments of regular troops were eventually required
before the pillaging mobs could be subdued. A recent commentator
has suggested several reasons for this violent reaction to the draft:
There was something deeply disturbing about a national military
draft at best. It was not unheard of for states to raise their army
quotas by various forms of compulsion, true. But a state government in the 1860's exerted a neighborly, close-to-home sort of
authority. Or at least it seemed so to most people. Washington was
different-distant and unfeeling, somehow alien. And for the average citizen, this new Act was the first effort the Federal government
had ever made to reach out its
long arm and lay its heavy hand
2 20
directly on his-hisl-shoulder.
Some state and local governments joined the popular opposition
to conscription. The state of Delaware and the city of Troy, New
York, for example, passed laws authorizing the local government to
pay the commutation fee for residents, and the Governor of Massachusetts asked the Secretary of War to suspend operation of the
draft in that state for six or seven weeks because a sufficient number
of substitutes could not be found. The people were also astute to
find means of circumventing the draft law. Enrolling officers, who
were required to canvass neighborhoods in order to find eligible
males, were frequently lied to, avoided, and even physically attacked. Outright evasion was so widespread that a new word"skedaddling"--was coined to describe it; new towns sprang up
just across the northern borders in Canada, and many men took
refuge in California or the mining towns of the western territories.
In many parts of New England, so many farm laborers had deserted
their employers and fled from the draft that crops were harvested
only with great difficulty. The total number of "skedaddlers" may
have been as high as 200,000.221

Fraudulent exemptions were another popular means of evasion,
and approximately 316,000 exemptions were made under the conscription law. When firemen became exempt, some towns enrolled
219. Civil War Enrollment Act, ch. 75, § 13, 12 Stat. 733 (1863). Subsequently the
commutation fee was eliminated except for conscientious objectors (Act of July 4, 1864,
ch. 237, §§ 2, 10, 13 Stat. 379-80), but enrollees were still permitted to furnish substitutes (Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 237, § 11, 13 Stat. 380).
220. J. McCAGuE, THE SECOND REBELLION 17 (1968).
221. 2 F. SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNIoN ARMY,
1861-1865, at 184-85 (1928).
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all of their able-bodied men into the fire brigade; in 1864 Congress
had to pass special legislation to meet such wholesale attempts to
avoid service. 222 Malingering of practically every variety occurred,
even to the point that some men maimed themselves in order to fail
the physical requirements for the army. The combination of evasion, exemptions, commutations, and armed resistance showed that
a substantial portion of the nation was not prepared to accept conscription as a part of the citizen's obligation to the state. As the end
of the war approached, Congress began to respond to this general
opposition; in March of 1865, a law providing for more liberal substitution was passed, 223 and the following month the draft law was
allowed to expire.
This history of inefficiency and evasion seems to cast doubt on
the Arver Court's assertion that "[i]t would be childish to deny the
value of the added strength which was ...

afforded"2 24 by the Civil

War draft. The Court based this conclusion on "the official report
of the Provost Marshall General," which claimed that "it was the
efficient aid resulting from the forces created by the draft . . . which
obviated a disaster ... and carried that struggle to a complete and

successful conclusion."2'25 The available statistics, however, cast considerable doubt on this assertion:
Altogether, only six per cent of the 2,666,999 men who served in the
Union Army during the Civil War were secured directly through
conscription. Of 249,259 persons "held to service" under the Enrollment Act of 1863, 86,724 escaped by payment of commutation,
leaving 168,649 "men raised." But of the latter, 116,188226were substitutes, and only 46,347 were "held to personal service."
No case questioning the Civil War draft was heard by the Supreme Court, but it is known that Chief Justice Roger Taney
prepared a rough outline of an opinion declaring the act unconstitutional. Taney's draft opinion began by noting that congressional
power to call out the militia for specified purposes, and asking
"what description of persons composes the militia who ... may be
called to aid the general government in the emergencies ... men-

tioned?" 227 The answer, he said, could be found in the second
amendment's declaration that "a well regulated Militia; being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to
keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed":
222.
223.
224.
225.

Act of Feb. 24, 1864, ch. 13, 13 Stat. 6.
Act of March 3, 1865, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 487.
245 U.S. at 387.
Id.
226. R. WEIGLEY, HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES ARjy 210 (1967).

227. 18

TYLER'S QUARTERLY HISTORICAL AND GENEALOGICAL MAGAZINE

79 (1939).
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The militia is therefore to be composed of Citizens of the States,
who retain all their rights and privileges as citizens, who when
called into service by the United States are not to be "fused into one
body"-nor confounded with the Army of the United States, but
are to be called out as the militia of the several states . . . and

consequently commanded by the officers appointed by the State. It
that they are recognized in the
is only in that form or organization
228
Constitution as a military force.
Given this clear distinction between the army and the militia,
Taney continued, the limitations on the President's power to control the militia are equally clear: "He has no power over the Militia
unless [they are] called into the actual service of the United States.
They are then called out in the language of the Constitution, as
the militia of the several States." 229 This constitutional plan would
be thwarted, Taney believed, if the government exercised the power
of direct conscription:
There is no longer any militia-it is absorbed in the Army. Every
able bodied Citizen . .. belongs to the national forces-that is to
the Army of the United States ....
The Generals, Colonels and other Officers appointed by the
State according to the provisions of the Constitution are reduced to
the ranks, and compelled to march as private soldiers ... and they
and every other able bodied citizen except those whom it has been
the pleasure of Congress to exempt, are compelled against their will
to subject themselves to military law . . . and to be treated as deserters if they refuse to surrender their civil rights. 230

Thus, said Taney, implying the power of direct conscription would
create an inconsistency among the military clauses of the constitution; the power of direct conscription into the federal army and the
militia provisions would be "repugnant to each other" because "if
the conscription law be authorized by the Constitution, then all of
the clauses so elaborately prepared in relation to the militia . . .
are of no practical value and may be set aside and annulled when-

ever Congress may deem it expedient." 23 1 Nor could this difficulty
be overcome, Taney asserted, by claiming that no restrictions had
been placed on the power to raise armies. "No just rule of construction," he wrote, "can give any weight to inferences drawn from general words, when these inferences are opposed to special and express
provisions [governing the militia], in the same instrument. ' 23 2
Chief Justice Taney also relied upon history to support his con228.
229.
230.
231.

Id.
Id. at 80.
Id.
Id.

232. Id. at 81.
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struction of the military clauses. "During the period when the
United States were English Colonies," he observed, "the Army of
England-the standing army-was always raised by voluntary enlistments-and the right to coerce all the able bodied subjects of
the Crown into the ranks of the Army

. .

. was not claimed or ex-

government." 233

Against this historical backercised by the English
ground, Taney concluded, the words granting Congress the power
to raise armies "necessarily implied that they were to be raised in
the usual manner." Indeed, he added, "the general government
has always heretofore so understood [the words] and has uniformly
... recruited the ranks of its 'land forces' by volunteer enlistments
'23 4
for a specific period.

Chief Justice Taney never had the opportunity to perfect or
deliver his opinion because the Government never brought a draft
case to the Supreme Court. However, the constitutionality of the
Civil War draft was questioned in the courts of Pennsylvania and
ultimately was upheld in Kneedler v. Lane.215 The Kneedler case,
upon which the Arver Court relied, 236 was decided under rather

unusual circumstances. It arose when three young men sued the
local enrolling board to enjoin the board members from enforcing
the law; the United States did not defend these actions, and on
November 9, 1863, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced in
a three-to-two decision that the law was unconstitutional.
The first opinion for the majority was written by Chief Justice
Walter Lowrie. He found that the Constitution recognized two distinct kinds of land forces, the militia and the army. The militia
could be drawn into federal service only in the manner provided by
the Constitution; if these forces were subject to paramount federal
call, they could be effectively wiped out. Moreover, Lowrie said,
the Constitution provides that taxes and duties must be raised according to a rule of "uniformity, equality, or proportion," but no
such requirement is imposed by the army clause. If the army "may
be recruited by force," he asserted, "we find no regulation or limitation of the exercise of the power, so as to prevent it from being
arbitrary and partial, and hence we infer that such a mode of raising
armies was not thought of, and was not granted." Lowrie dwelt at
length on the dangers of implying such a broad power:
If Congress may institute the plan now under consideration, as
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
45 Pa. 238 (1863).
245 U.S. at 388.
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a necessary and proper mode of exercising its power "to raise and
support armies," then it seems to me to follow with more force
that it may take a similar mode in the exercise of other powers,
and may compel people to lend it their money; take their houses
for offices and courts; . . . their mechanics and workshops for the
different branches of business that are needed for army supplies;
their physicians, ministers, and women for army surgeons, chaplains,
nurses, and cooks .... I am quite unable now to suppose that so
great a power could have been intended to be granted, and yet to
23 7
be left so loosely guarded.
Judge George W. Woodward issued a concurring opinion which
relied heavily on the English experience. The framers, he said, had
borrowed freely from the English system, and were familiar with
the struggles which had prevented universal conscription in Great
Britain. The framers intended, he argued, to create "a more free
constitution than that of Great Britain-taking that as a model in
some things-but enlarging the basis of popular rights in all respects that would be consistent with order and stability." Thus
Woodward concluded that "[a]ssuredly the framers of our constitution did not intend to subject the people of the states to a system
of conscription which was applied in the mother country only to
paupers and vagabonds."23 Judge James Thompson's concurrence
also emphasized that the customary mode of raising armies in England had been voluntary enlistments. He then pointed out that at
the time the Constitution was ratified a substantial segment of public opinion opposed any form of standing army; "but what would
have been thought," Thompson asked, "if it had been discovered or
avowed that in its creation [the federal army] might be directly and
openly destructive of the individual liberties of those who were to
compose it, and that it might be extended to embrace all the ablebodied citizens in the statesl" 9
The injunctions prayed for were issued on November 9, 1863.
However, Chief Justice Lowrie's term expired on December 12,
and he was replaced by Daniel Agnew, who was known to favor the
draft. The Government then moved to vacate the injunctions. On
January 16, 1864, the court vacated the initial orders over a bitter
237. 45 Pa. at 248.
238. 45 Pa. at 254-55.
239. 45 Pa. at 267. The two judges who voted in favor of the act on first hearing
were William Strong and John M. Read. Strong relied primarily upon the lack of
constitutional restrictions on the power to raise armies, and upon the drafts imposed
by the states during the Revolutionary War. Read depended upon the obligation
of every member of society to defend the state; he cited the Knox plan of 1790,
Monroe's 1814 draft proposal, and the English laws providing for a levy on idle and
disorderly persons to show prior recognitions of the power.
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dissent by Judge Woodward, who had just been elevated to the
position of Chief Justice. The Government, he pointed out, had
failed to appear in the first hearing even though every opportunity
had been given them to present their views; nor had they made
any effort to seek reargument while Chief Justice Lowrie was still
on the bench. Moreover, he said, the decision granting the injunction was a final judgment which could have been appealed to the
United States Supreme Court; in any event, the dissenting judges
should have been bound by the initial decision since no new facts
had been presented. 24 0 On this divisive note, the Government obtained a victory in the first case to pass upon the constitutionality
of conscription; but the narrow margin of this victory is emphasized by the fact that three of the six Pennsylvania judges who considered the matter held that Congress lacked the power to enforce
direct conscription.
C. World War I and After
After the expiration of the Civil War draft, the Government did
not attempt to use conscription again until the outbreak of World
War I. On April 5, 1917-the day before Congress declared war on
Germany-the Wilson administration introduced its Army Bill,
which provided for compulsory military service. Opposition arose
immediately, with Speaker of the House Champ Clark insisting on
a volunteer system. "I protest with all my heart and mind and soul,"
he proclaimed, "against having the slur of being a conscript placed
upon the men of Missouri. In the estimation of Missourians there
241
is precious little difference between a conscript and a convict."
The Senate opposition was led by Robert M. LaFollette. "[The]
power once granted," he said, "will attach to the office [of the President], and will be exercised so long as the Nation shall last, by every
successive incumbent, no matter how ambitious or bloody-minded
he may be." 242 Nevertheless, on May 18, 1917, the Selective Service
Act was passed by large majorities in both Houses. June 5, 1917,
was set as registration day, and most Americans responded to the
call.
The hysteria of World War I created what was probably the
most serious erosion of political and civil liberty in our history.
Zechariah Chafee, in his famed analysis of Free Speech in the
United States, recounts numerous instances of official disregard for
240. 45 Pa. at 823-29.
241. H. PETERSON & G.
242. Id.
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1917-1918, at 22 (1957).
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first amendment rights. 243 Under the Espionage Act,244 any statement which tended to obstruct the draft became criminal, 24 5 and
the courts enforced this provision vigorously. J. P. Doe, son of the
great Chief Justice of New Hampshire, was convicted for writing a
chain letter arguing that Germany had not broken its promise to
the United States on submarine warfare. The producer of a film
entitled "The Spirit of '76," which contained footage on Patrick
Henry's speech, the Declaration of Independence, and scenes of
British outrages committed during the Revolution, was also found
guilty under the Espionage Act, since Britain was then our ally.
Abraham Sugarman, Minnesota state secretary of the Socialist Party,
told an open meeting: "This is supposed to be a free country. Like
Hell it is." He then stated that the Selective Draft Act was unconstitutional and that no one had to obey it. He, too, was convicted, and
246
a federal judge sentenced him to three years at Leavenworth.
Ministers who preached that it was against Christian principles to
fight were prosecuted, as were vigorous political opponents of congressmen who had voted for conscription. 2 7 Twenty-seven farmers
from South Dakota claimed that their county's draft quota was too
high and argued against the war generally; they received one-year
sentences. Socialists, I.W.W. members, and labor leaders opposed
to the war were systematically rounded up, tried in the most perfunctory manner before judges who openly called them traitors,
and given maximum sentences. Newspapers and magazines that editorialized against the war were denied mailing privileges; insuffi248
ciently patriotic teachers were removed from their posts.
In this atmosphere the Supreme Court's decision in the Selective
Draft Law Cases was almost inevitable. Suggestions by critics of the
war that the draft was unconstitutional had led to indictments
under the Espionage Act, and the overwhelming sentiment in the
country was in favor of maximum mobilization to fight the hated
Germans. The briefs in the Arver case never even touched on the
early history of the military clauses; instead, they focused primarily
on the thirteenth amendment's prohibition of involuntary servitude. It is most unfortunate that such an important question was
243. At 42, 51, 80 (1941). See also Kalven, "Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open"
Note on Free Speech and the Warren Court, 67 MicH. L. REv. 289, 290-91 (1968).
244. Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917), as amended, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
245. Ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (1917), as amended. ch. 75, § 1, 40 Stat. 553
(1918). See also CHartE, supra note 243, at 39.
246. H. PETErSON & G. FiTE, supra note 241, at 37. See also Kalven, supra note
243, at 290-91.
247. Id. at 115-16, 155.
248. Id. at 43-60, 92-112, 203-04.
-A
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resolved in such an unsatisfactory decision; yet, despite its manifest
deficiencies and questionable arguments, the Arver opinion has survived unchallenged as part of our constitutional doctrine.
One reason for the survival of the Selective Draft Law Cases may
be in the fact that conscription is a relatively rare phenomenon in
this country. From 1789 until 1940-the first 151 years of the nation's history--draft laws were in force for a total of only four years,
once during the Civil War and once during World War I. Proposals for compulsory military service were firmly rejected by Congress in the 1920's and 1930's.249 Finally, when the German army
overran France in 1940, Congress again assented to a conscription
program-the first peacetime draft in our history-over vociferous
opposition in both houses. 250 This was the last time that any substantial political opinion opposed conscription until January 1969,
when nine senators introduced a bill to return to a volunteer system -5 ' and President Nixon recommended abolition of the draft.252
Perhaps the growing public opposition to the most unpopular war
in the nation's history will persuade Congress to revert to the kind
of military establishment contemplated by the Constitution, or provide the Supreme Court with the opportunity to give the military
clauses of the Constitution the full and inpartial judicial consideration that they demand but have never received.
3 TE S.LEcrV SERVacE Acr, 224, 232, 237
249. See SxLEaVn SERvIcz SysraE,
(Special Monograph No. 2, 1954).
250. For example, Senator Arthur Vandenberg of Michigan told the Senate:
I am opposed to tearing up 150 years of American history and tradition, in which
none but volunteers have [sic] entered the peacetime Armies and Navies of the

United States ....
There must have been sound reasons all down the years why our predecessors
in the Congress always consistently and relentlessly shunned this thing which we
are now asked to do. These reasons must have been related in some indispensable
fashion to the fundamental theory that peacetime military conscription is repugnant to the spirit of democracy and the soul of Republican institutions, and
that it leads in dark directions.
Gillam, The Peacetime Draft, 57 YAIE Rxv. 495, 498 (1968). Even the Act's supporters

insisted it was a temporary expedient. Representative James W. Wadsworth, who
introduced the legislation, said: "This is an emergency measure. . . . It is not an
attempt to establish a permanent policy in the United States." Id. at 502.
251. Voluntary Military Manpower Procurement Act of 1969, S. 503, 91st Cong.,
1st sess. For reports of the introduction of this bill, see 115 CoNG. Rc. S691-99 (daily
ed. Jan. 22, 1969); N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1969, at 1, col. 8.
252. N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 1969, at 1, col. 8.

